The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
18. This chapter was intended to be devoted to a
consideration, not of the processes by which nature produces
the series with which we are concerned, but of the theoretic
basis of the methods by which we can determine the existence
of such series. But it is not possible to keep the two enquiries
apart, for here, at any rate, the old maxim prevails that to
know a thing we must know its causes. Recur for a minute
to the considerations of the last chapter. We there saw
that there was a large class of events, the conditions of production
of which could be said to consist of (1) a comparatively
few nearly unchangeable elements, and (2) a vast number
of independent and very changeable elements. At least if
there were any other elements besides these, we are assumed
either to make special allowance for them, or to omit them
from our enquiry. Now in certain cases, such as games of
chance, the unchangeable elements may without practical
error be regarded as really unchangeable throughout any
range of time and space. Hence, as a result, the deductive
method of treatment becomes in their case at once the most
simple, natural, and conclusive; but, as a further consequence,
the statistics of the events, if we choose to appeal to them,
may be collected _ad libitum_ with better and better approximation
to truth. On the other hand, in all social
applications of Probability, the unchangeable causes can only
be regarded as really unchangeable under many qualifications.
We know little or nothing of them directly; they are
often in reality numerous, indeterminate, and fluctuating;
and it is only under the guarantee of stringent restrictions of
time and place, that we can with any safety attribute to
them sufficient fixity to justify our theory. Hence, as a
result, the deductive method, under whatever name it may
go, becomes totally inapplicable both in theory and practice;
and, as a further consequence, the appeal to statistics has to
be made with the caution in mind that we shall do mischief
rather than good if we go on collecting too many of them.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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