The logic of modern physicsBridgman, P. W. (Percy Williams)
Philosophy
The logic of modern physics
Bridgman, P. W. (Percy Williams)
Physics -- Philosophy
We may now gain further familiarity with the operational attitude toward
a concept and some of its implications by examining from this point of
view the concept of length. Our task is to find the operations by which
we measure the length of any concrete physical object. We begin with
objects of our commonest experience, such as a house or a house lot.
What we do is sufficiently indicated by the following rough description.
We start with a measuring rod, lay it on the object so that one of its
ends coincides with one end of the object, mark on the object the
position of the other end of the rod, then move the rod along in a
straight line extension of its previous position until the first end
coincides with the previous position of the second end, repeat this
process as often as we can, and call the length the total number of
times the rod was applied. This procedure, apparently so simple, is in
practice exceedingly complicated, and doubtless a full description of
all the precautions that must be taken would fill a large treatise. We
must, for example, be sure that the temperature of the rod is the
standard temperature at which its length is defined, or else we must
make a correction for it; or we must correct for the gravitational
distortion of the rod if we measure a vertical length; or we must be
sure that the rod is not a magnet or is not subject to electrical
forces. All these precautions would occur to every physicist. But we
must also go further and specify all the details by which the rod is
moved from one position to the next on the object--its precise path
through space and its velocity and acceleration in getting from one
position to another. Practically of course, precautions such as these
are not mentioned, but the justification is in our experience that
variations of procedure of this kind are without effect on the final
result. But we always have to recognize that all our experience is
subject to error, and that at some time in the future we may have to
specify more carefully the acceleration, for example, of the rod in
moving from one position to another, if experimental accuracy should be
so increased as to show a measurable effect. In _principle_ the
operations by which length is measured should be _uniquely_ specified.
If we have more than one set of operations, we have more than one
concept, and strictly there should be a separate name to correspond to
each different set of operations.
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