The logic of modern physicsBridgman, P. W. (Percy Williams)
Philosophy
The logic of modern physics
Bridgman, P. W. (Percy Williams)
Physics -- Philosophy
With regard to the general question of simple laws, there are at least
two attitudes; one is that there are probably simple general laws still
undiscovered, the other is that nature has a predilection for simple
laws. I do not see how there can be any quarrel with the first of these
attitudes. Let us examine the second. We have in the first place to
notice that "simple" means simple to us, when stated in terms of our
concepts. This is in itself sufficient to raise a presumption against
this general attitude. It is evident that our thinking must follow those
lines imposed by the nature of our thinking mechanism: does it seem
likely that all nature accepts these same limitations? If this were the
case, our conceptions ought to stand in certain simple and definite
relations to nature. Now if our discussion has brought out any one
thing, it is that our concepts are not well defined things, but they are
hazy and do not fit nature exactly, and many of them fit even
approximately only within restricted range. The task of finding concepts
which shall adequately describe nature and at the same time be easily
handled by us, that is, be simple, is the most important and difficult
of physics, and we never achieve more than approximate and temporary
success. Consider the example of time. The original concept of local
time, which for long seemed satisfactory, turns out to be inadequate,
and has to be replaced by extended time, which is so complicated that it
is questionable whether we shall ever be able to grasp it with the
confidence that we must demand in a useful concept (by "grasp" I mean
intuitive command of all the implications of the operations which are
involved). The concept has not yet been found which describes simply the
temporal relations of the universe.
Not only are concepts hazy around the edges and so incapable of fitting
nature exactly, but there is always the chance that there are concepts
other than those which we have adopted which would fit our present
phenomena. Finding concepts to fit nature is much like solving a
cross-word puzzle. In the puzzle there may be some parts of the pattern
which we fill completely and easily, but sometimes we find parts in
which we can fill in everything except one or two obstinate definitions,
so that we are sure we are on the right track, and rack our brains for
the missing words, when with a flash of inspiration we see that the
obstinate words can be fitted in by a complete change in those which we
had already accepted. It may be that we are soon to witness a similar
change in our concept of the nature of light. An important difference
between the cross-word puzzle and nature is that we can never tell when
we have filled in all the squares in any of the parts of nature's
puzzle; there is always the possibility of new phenomena which our
present scheme does not touch.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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