The logic of modern physicsBridgman, P. W. (Percy Williams)
Philosophy
The logic of modern physics
Bridgman, P. W. (Percy Williams)
Physics -- Philosophy
Until a more careful analysis of the situation is made it
would seem therefore that there is some ground for the suspicion that
the principle of relativity is involved in the possibility of giving to
physical phenomena a _complete_ mathematical formulation, understanding
"complete" to mean "including the descriptive background."
CHAPTER III
DETAILED CONSIDERATION OF VARIOUS
CONCEPTS OF PHYSICS
WE now begin our detailed consideration of the most important concepts
of physics. It is entirely beyond the scope of this essay to attempt
more than an indication of some of the most important matters. Neither
is it to be expected that the parts of this discussion will always have
a very close connection with each other; the purpose of the discussion
is to aid in acquiring the greatest possible self-consciousness of the
whole structure of physics.
THE CONCEPT OF SPACE
A logically satisfying definition of what we understand by the concept
of space is doubtless difficult to give, but we shall not be far from
the mark if we think of it as the aggregate of all those concepts which
have to do with position. Position means position of something. The
position of things is determined by some system of measurement; perhaps
the simplest is that implied in a Cartesian coördinate system with its
three measurements of length. Hence much of the essential discussion of
space has already been given in connection with the concept of length.
We have seen that measurements of length are made with physical
measuring rods applied to some physical object. We cannot measure the
distance between two points in empty space, because if space were empty
there would be nothing to identify the position of the ends of the
measuring rod when we move it from one position to the next. We see,
then, from the point of view of operations that the framework of
Cartesian geometry, often imagined in an ideal mathematical sense, is
really a physical framework, and that what we mean by spatial properties
is nothing but the properties of this framework. When we say that space
is Euclidean, we mean that the physical space of meter sticks is
Euclidean: it is meaningless to ask whether empty space is Euclidean.
Geometry, therefore, in so far as its results are expected to apply to
the external physical world, and in as far as it is not a logical system
built up from postulates, is an experimental science. This view is now
well understood and accepted, but there was a time when it was not
accepted, but vigorously attacked; the change of attitude toward this
question is symptomatic of a change of attitude toward many other
similar questions.
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