Whether or not the movement of Longstreet against Burnside originated with Mr. Jefferson Davis, as Gen. Grant was informed, it appears from the following letter published in 1871,[64] that Gen. Longstreet was dissatisfied with the way in which Gen. Bragg had ordered things and was conducting operations in front of Chattanooga; that he attributed the idea of his own expedition to Bragg’s mind; that he thought it was the least favorable of opportunities for relief to the situation, but that having heard of it, he had proposed, without avail, a plan to make the movement greatly advantageous. Gen. Grant in his Memoirs, puts the force with which Longstreet left Chattanooga “to go against Burnside” at about 15,000 troops besides Wheeler’s Cavalry, 5,000 more. Extract from a letter written by Gen. Longstreet, dated July 12th, 1871: “I have just concluded to send you a copy of a letter written by me just on the point of mounting my horse to start upon the East Tennessee campaign. It was written after my tent was struck, sitting in the rain, (a light drizzle) from the head of an empty flour barrel; but I think that, concise and hurriedly as it was written, it plainly indicated that I understood what Grant’s campaign would be; that is, I understood the conditions and situations of the two armies well enough to know what Grant _should_ do, and it is always safe to assume, with such a man, that he will do what he should do. Seeing the letter that I send a copy of, amongst my papers that I was overlooking. I determined to send it, in order that you might be assured of our force and of my appreciation of the campaign when it was projected by General Bragg:” HEADQUARTERS, CHATTANOOGA, Nov. 5, 1863. S. B. BUCKNER, MAJOR GENERAL. MY DEAR GENERAL--I start to-day for Tyner’s Station, and expect to get transportation to-morrow for Sweetwater. The weather is so bad, and I find myself so occupied that I shall not be able to see you to say good-bye. When I heard the report around camp, that I was to go into East Tennessee, I set to work at once to try and plan the means of making the move with security, and the hope of great results. As every other move had been proposed to the General and rejected, or put off till time made them more inconvenient, I came to the conclusion as soon as the report reached me, that this was to be the fate of our army; to await till all good opportunities had passed, and then, in desperation, to seize upon the least favorable one.