agreed to march for Inverness in two separate bodies, the one the Highland road, and the other by the coast, severals at first being for the army all going one road. The day of the battle of Falkirk the officers were called on the field where the army was drawn up betwixt Bannockburn and the Torwood, and all agreed immediately to march to the enemy; also the retreat from Stirling, it was advised by many of the principal officers, particularly the clans. They drew up the reasons and sign'd them at Falkirk three days before the retreat was made, the chief of which was that a vast number of men had gone off after the battle, and were not returned, and that the siege of Stirling Castle was not advancing; they did not think it advisable to fight in such circumstances. [199] No wonder that councils of war were out of request, when the Prince was always thwarted in them, and hardly got his will in anything he proposed, though his opinion of things in the event turned out to be the most eligible. Lord George Murray was at the head of the opposition, having got the ascendant of the greater part of the chiftains, and having insinuated himself into the good graces of all the clans who were ever ready to embrace his schemes. Besides, it was most unlucky that great jealousies and misunderstandings had arisen betwixt Lord George Murray and the French officers. These things are too notour to admit of any denial.--ROBERT FORBES, A.M. [Sidenote: _fol._ 454.] This letter has been much longer than I intended. But before I conclude I must acquaint you that six weeks before the battle of Culloden some officers proposed sending up meal to several parts of the Highlands, and in particular to Badenoch, that in the event of the Duke of Cumberland's army marching towards Inverness before the army was gathered they might retreat for a few days till they could assemble; or if a misfortune should happen by a defeat there might be some provisions in these parts. But this was reckoned a timorous advice and rejected as such, though I have reason to believe that the opinion of mostly all the Highland officers was much the same. There was no doubt the Highlanders could have avoided fighting till they had found their advantages. In so doing they could have made a summer campaign without running the risque of any misfortune. They could have marched through the hills to places in Aberdeenshire, Banffshire, [Sidenote: _fol._ 455.] the Merns, Angus, Perthshire, or Argyleshire by ways that no regular troops could have followed them; and if the regular troops had continued among the mountains they must have been attended with great difficulties and expence. Their convoys might have been cut off, and opportunities offered to have attacked them with almost a certainty of success. And though the Highlanders had neither money nor magazines they could not have starved in that season of the year, so long as there were any sheep or cattle to be had.