They could also have separated into two or three different bodies, got meal for some days' provision, met again at a place appointed, and have attacked the enemy where was least expected. They could have marched in three days what would have taken regular troops five. Nay, had these taken the high roads (as often they would have been obliged to do upon account of their [Sidenote: _fol._ 456.] carriages) it would have taken them ten or twelve. In short, they would have been so harrassed and fatigued, that they must have been in the greatest distress and difficulties; and at the long run probably been destroyed. At least, much might have been expected by gaining of time. Perhaps such succours might have come from France as would have made the Highlanders to have made an offensive instead of a defensive war. This I saw was the opinion of many of the officers who considered the consequences of losing a battle. They knew well that few of the Highlanders would join heartily against them, as long as they continued entire, but would upon a defeat. There was one great objection to this, that the Irish officers, who were all as brave men and zealous in the cause as possibly could be, and many of the low-country men, could not endure the fatigue of a Highland campaign. As to the common [Sidenote: _fol._ 457.] soldiers that came from France there were not four hundred of them remaining. They and their officers, even though a battle was lost, had but to surrender and be made prisoners of war. It was very different with the Scots, whose safety depended upon their not venturing a battle without great probability of success. But any proposition to postpone fighting was ill-received and was called discouraging the army. I have nothing further to add, but am, etc. _Leith, Saturday, October 17th, 1747._ [Sidenote: 17 Oct. 1747]