It must be borne in mind that the objectives which General Franchet d’Espérey originally had in view were relatively modest, and many of his subordinate Commanders doubted that even these could be fully attained. The idea, even of the most optimistic, was that the Bulgarian first lines would probably be broken through, but that the enemy would offer a desperate resistance on the second and third lines, and that it would then be necessary for the Allies to entrench themselves again in new positions for another long period of waiting. The Commanders of the different Allied contingents, therefore, made superhuman efforts to collect all the necessary material with the object of reconstituting the defences on the new advanced lines which they expected to occupy. The scarcity of barbed wire was a source of grave anxiety for all Commands, and Staff officers lay awake at night wondering how on earth the troops could entrench themselves after having abandoned all the barbed wire in front of their present positions. The Serbs alternated between the most unlimited hopes and the blackest pessimism. A great many of them doubted the possibility of breaking through the Vetrenik-Dobropolje line, while on the other hand the officers of the Serbian G.H.Q. openly declared that an offensive which did not result in an advance beyond Uskub would be an irreparable disaster, because the Army would suffer such losses that, if the troops did not re-enter Old Serbia, it would be impossible to fill up the gaps and they would be incapable of carrying out any more operations. General Franchet d’Espérey himself, to judge by his statements, did expect to strike a formidable blow at the Bulgarians and thus render them inclined to conclude a separate peace, to which the Allied victories in France and the fact that neither the Germans nor the Austro-Hungarians were now in a position to send help to their satellites in the East, would contribute. But even he did not dream of a complete and overwhelming victory.