The enemy’s communications were the following: The vital artery of the whole army was the Belgrade-Nish-Uskub-Veles-Ghevgheli railway, with a branch from Uskub to Kalkandelen (Tetovo). The Nish-Sofia-Constantinople line supplied the troops further east. From the former, several décauvilles and telepherics branched off. The most important was the one from Gradsko to Prilep, whence others extended to all the chief points of that area. Prilep, in fact, was a sort of Clapham Junction for décauvilles, with an imposing station. From Radomir on the Sofia-Kutstendil-Guyeshevo railway there was a very long décauville to the Demir Hissar bridge, which supplied almost the whole of the II Army. The enemy was richer in décauvilles than we were, but their road system was much poorer. As they had few lorries, and these without rubber tyres, the iron wheels reduced the roads to an appalling state. The Bulgarian Army made great use of the peasants’ ox-carts and of mules and small mountain ponies. On the whole the enemy’s transport was inadequate. Their only advantage was the possibility of obtaining supplies from Central Europe by rail. Salonica, it is true, was nearer to the Allied front than Belgrade, Nish or Sofia to that of the enemy, but the sea passage to Salonica was still exposed to submarine dangers, and tonnage was scarce, especially in the summer of 1918, on account of the transport of American troops to France. The enemy could, moreover, obtain reinforcements from the German garrisons in Roumania and from the depots in Bulgaria. What the Allies did not know was how far the Germans could reduce their garrisons in Roumania and whether the Bulgarians were still provided with abundant reserves. The Bulgarian battalions at the front were much stronger than those of the Allies, but according to information obtained by the Allied intelligence services it appeared that the depots were almost empty and that there were not more than three or four Bulgarian militia regiments available in Serbia or Bulgaria to be sent to the front. The conditions of the Germans in Roumania and South Russia were even less well known. The Bulgarian _moral_ was, as we have seen, becoming even more depressed. War weariness was spreading and led to increased desertions, and in a few cases to mutiny. The German troops which served to stiffen the Bulgarians had been greatly reduced, and relations between the two were by no means too friendly. What was certain was that neither the French, the British nor the Italian Commands intended to send out another man to Macedonia, so that the C.A.A. must count exclusively on the troops actually in the country for the coming struggle. The Italian forces in Albania being about equal to those of the Austrians, there was no likelihood of reinforcements being available on either side. CHAPTER XV THE BATTLE OF THE BALKANS