The Making of a Modern Army and its Operations in the Field: A study based on the experience of three years on the French front (1914-1917)Radiguet, René-Louis-Jules
History
The Making of a Modern Army and its Operations in the Field: A study based on the experience of three years on the French front (1914-1917)
Radiguet, René-Louis-Jules
Armies; Military art and science; World War, 1914-1918
=1. General Remarks.= When her dream of a short war which was to
realize all her aims of conquest was dissipated, Germany resorted to a
policy of occupation in the hope of either maintaining her hold upon
the territory she had seized, or else of eventually using it as an
asset in negotiations for peace. At the end of 1914 she occupied nearly
the whole area of seven French Departments, three or four of which are
among the richest agricultural and industrial districts of France.
To attain her ends, Germany intrenched her armies on the nearest front
that she had time to occupy, one of several defensive lines which she
had selected long before. Her spies, in time of peace, had furnished
her with accurate knowledge of all the important positions.
Thus, when the German armies of the first line were beaten on the
Marne, and fell back in disorder, they found, at a distance of three
or four days’ march, beyond Soissons, on the frontier of Lorraine, an
unbroken line of intrenchments already organized by the second-line
troops while they were operating their enforced retreat.
The French pursuing armies had not, in September, 1914, the material
means of assaulting the enemy’s intrenchments. They had just fought
a series of battles which had considerably lessened their effective
forces. Their regiments had to be officered anew. They had no
alternative but to intrench themselves, on positions as little
disadvantageous as possible, in front of the enemy. Thus all along a
line extending from the North Sea, at Nieuport, to the frontier of
Switzerland, began the formidable conflict which is still raging.
The distance between the two hostile fronts varies from 30 or 40 metres
to 1200 or 1500 metres at most.
After big attacks, prepared by long bombardments, the first lines cease
to exist, and very often both of the hostile fronts are merged into one
another. The most advanced small outposts have no other shelter than
that of shell-craters, and it is by means of grenades thrown from one
crater to another, and with whatever earthworks can be improvised with
the tools on hand, that attempts to rectify the fronts are made.
Both parties, most of the time, have three successive lines of
organized defence, and sometimes more.
It is to be noted, however, that while the Germans have adhered to
the three-line principle in the sectors where they believe themselves
but slightly threatened, on the fronts where they are heavily pressed
by the Allied Armies, they have organized, as their advanced lines
weakened or were forced, a series of very strong positions, one behind
the other. It is impossible to be precise as to the number of these
lines. According to the reports of the aviators, several complete
systems of defences exist between the positions they are now defending
and the Meuse.
It is interesting to remark that the multiplication of large-calibre
artillery has caused changes to be made by both belligerents in the
construction of shelters and intrenchments.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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