The Making of a Modern Army and its Operations in the Field: A study based on the experience of three years on the French front (1914-1917) — John Shaqi
The Making of a Modern Army and its Operations in the Field: A study based on the experience of three years on the French front (1914-1917)Radiguet, René-Louis-Jules
History
The Making of a Modern Army and its Operations in the Field: A study based on the experience of three years on the French front (1914-1917)
Radiguet, René-Louis-Jules
Armies; Military art and science; World War, 1914-1918
Wherever defence only is contemplated, the protection of wire
is essential, but it will be well to bear in mind that too many
entanglements may prove inconvenient at the time of an attack. We
have seen that in such cases, the difficulty is solved by digging
communication trenches under the wires.
=3. Mines and counter-mines.= Since both parties dug themselves in,
much use has been made of mines and counter-mines, especially in 1915
and a part of 1916.
The aim of the mine is to throw the enemy into sudden consternation
and disorder, while destroying an advanced trench, or work. The French
considered the mine as a weapon with which it would be possible to
remedy at certain points the defects of their line.
They caused heavy losses to both parties, but are not so much used
now for the very good reason that, where the fronts have undergone
no change since 1914, the soil has been so greatly disturbed that it
would be absolutely impossible to make the necessary excavations. We
shall simply recall that in June, 1917, the British, prior to their
attack on Messines, set off twenty mines, each containing twenty-three
thousand kilograms of explosive, and as the Germans were not aware
of their construction, the effect of the explosions was terrible,
producing huge craters, seventy metres deep and several hundred metres
in circumference.
Mines are dug by hand or electric drills. The latter have the
disadvantage of making too much noise. Greatly improved systems
of “listening posts” permit the enemy’s operations to be detected
and opposed, and in all cases, excepting at Messines, where the
British bored their galleries at more than fifty metres underground,
mine-digging was carried on under great difficulties.
The best means to neutralize the danger of a mine whose construction
is discovered, is to reach it as quickly as possible by excavating a
“counter-mine,” and blow it up before the enemy has a chance to set
it off. The success of such a counter-mine is termed a _camouflet_
inflicted on the enemy.
In our opinion, mines and counter-mines will play a less and less
important part in the present war, but it will nevertheless be
necessary for our armies to be provided with the means of operating
them whenever the Command may deem them advisable.
=4. Special railway troops.--Transportation by roads.= Since the
beginning of the war, France has been lacking in special technical
corps, especially for the railways. Her ante-bellum system was
insufficient to cope with the rapid development of the military
operations, and the reorganization rendered necessary by trench warfare
along an extensive front.
A large proportion of the railroad employees was at first mobilized to
assist and reinforce the railway troops. Then, after a few months, a
large number of these men had to be sent back to their former civilian
duties, in order to assure the economical life of the country.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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