The Making of a Modern Army and its Operations in the Field: A study based on the experience of three years on the French front (1914-1917)Radiguet, René-Louis-Jules
History
The Making of a Modern Army and its Operations in the Field: A study based on the experience of three years on the French front (1914-1917)
Radiguet, René-Louis-Jules
Armies; Military art and science; World War, 1914-1918
ARMOURED MOTOR-CARS. On some armoured motor-cars small cannon are
used; on others, machine-guns are placed. They are intended to throw
the enemy lines into confusion at certain points. Their action must be
swift, sudden, and brief. Their mobility enables them to dodge the fire
of the enemy’s artillery. These cars can be much more useful in open
field operations than in trench warfare. They will be especially useful
as a help to cavalry when the latter can once more be used.
Every regiment of infantry is now provided with a section of three
37 mm. guns which being light, easy to move, and very accurate are
employed principally, either all together or in the proportion of
one to each battalion, against machine-guns. They have been greatly
appreciated by the regiment commanders; a large number will probably be
distributed as soon as they can be manufactured.
=5. Advance or withdrawal of the artillery.= One of the most
interesting questions for an army in the making, such as the American
Army, is that of the rapid moving of the heavy artillery, at a given
moment.
We do not hesitate to say that this problem is far from being entirely
solved on the Western Front, and that its study and organization will
be a very hard task for the engineers entrusted with its solution.
American engineers will have to go to the Western Front and see for
themselves all the difficulties to be surmounted.
ADVANCE. During the spring of 1917, the French Army had to pursue on
a large front an enemy who had not only devastated the country behind
them to a depth of from 30 to 35 kilometres, but had also accumulated
in this wilderness all the obstacles their fertile imagination could
suggest.
The 75 mm. field artillery alone, at the cost of great efforts and
tremendous loss of horses, managed to overtake, though somewhat late,
the advance of our infantry, which had succeeded in going forward
everywhere.
The sections for the supply of munitions followed their batteries,
but more slowly; and some batteries, which at the cost of great and
continuous efforts, had come into position, had no munitions.
The only way to guard against such delays, in the future, will be to
keep in reserve complementary teams of horses, to replace those that
are killed, or to help the batteries and their ammunition sections
through the worst passages.
We have not the right to give here in detail the difficulties
encountered in the advance of the heavy artillery. We were informed of
them by a confidential note from the High Command.
However, while this confidential note sets forth in detail all the
difficulties encountered, it makes no recommendation whatever as to
what should be done on such occasions in the future.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account