The Making of a Modern Army and its Operations in the Field: A study based on the experience of three years on the French front (1914-1917)Radiguet, René-Louis-Jules
History
The Making of a Modern Army and its Operations in the Field: A study based on the experience of three years on the French front (1914-1917)
Radiguet, René-Louis-Jules
Armies; Military art and science; World War, 1914-1918
To prevent the mobilization of the British armies, the Kaiser, after
entrenching his forces on the French Front, sent all the troops he
could dispose of against Calais. He felt so sure of success that he
followed the operations in person, ready to enter as a conqueror into
the city he expected to capture. He had acted in the same way two
months before at Nancy; and having failed in that effort, he was eager
for revenge.
The French, British, and Belgian armies took care to transform his
cherished revenge into a pitiful defeat.
It was then that the German Command committed the mistake which will
cause Germany to lose the war.
Leaving the Western Front, giving to the French and British armies time
to reorganize, arm, and gather strength, the Germans, having lost all
hope of achieving the dreamed-of victories in the West, hurled their
legions upon Russia, which they knew was insufficiently prepared, and
began that campaign which was to result in their capture of Poland and
the Baltic provinces, and the recovery of Galicia.
The consequences of the adoption of this new plan were to be seen at
once.
At the beginning of the summer of 1915, in Artois, the French and
British commenced to strike blows which proved that the strongest
system of field fortifications can be taken.
In September, 1915, General Pétain, in Champagne, inflicted a terrible
defeat upon the Germans. This operation, carried out simultaneously
with one in Artois, cost them thirty thousand prisoners, one hundred
and fifty guns, heavy casualties, and--which is even of greater
importance--obliged them to abandon highly valued and strongly
fortified positions.
In the beginning of 1916, having fulfilled their program in Russia,
the German General Staff resolved to finish with the Western Front, and
attacked Verdun with such enormous forces of artillery and infantry as
had never before been known.
Everywhere in Germany the announcement was made that the assault and
capture of Verdun would bring the war to an end.
Every one knows how vastly they were deceived. The French, taken by
surprise and shaken at first, rallied rapidly. During five months they
contested the ground inch by inch with a tenacity and heroism that
stamps the defence of Verdun as the most sublime military feat recorded
by History. The Germans did not take the fortress-city, but sacrificed
in their attempt the very flower of their armies.
Verdun had not exhausted all the strength of the French armies. On
the first day of June, 1916, on the Somme, General Foch attacked the
Germans so furiously that they had to suspend entirely their offensive
against Verdun.
On July 1st, the British Army, which had been developing to its final
form and efficiency, took its place on the left of the positions
of General Foch, and from that time on the Germans were forced to
transfer most of their effectives to the Somme and the Aisne in order
to oppose the Franco-British advance.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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