With regard to the pamphlet under consideration, the judge pointed out that it did not come before them as an obscene libel at common law. The question, therefore, whether the purpose advocated in the book (i.e., the limitation of families) was inconsistent with the morals of society, was not relevant. They had only to enquire if the details as to prudential checks, given in that pamphlet, were inconsistent with decency. It had been admitted in argument that the greater part of the work, dealing with the abstract necessity of limiting population, was not obscene. The only portion against which obscenity was alleged was the chapter in which the means by which conception could be prevented were stated, and in which the female sexual organs were described as far as necessary for the purpose. The question was thus raised--What is obscenity? After quoting the definition of the word which had been adopted in a previous case, Mr. Justice Windeyer laid down the principle that "it is the circumstances under which language is published, or acts done, that determine whether language or conduct is obscene. No natural function of the body is obscene itself. In the physical constitution of man, including all his natural instincts, there is nothing unholy or unclean." But certain natural actions, if performed in public, would be a gross outrage upon decency. In like manner, language that might be permissible and necessary if used on certain occasions, would manifestly be an outrage upon decency if used when occasion did not warrant it: The question therefore is, when language is objected to as obscene, whether the occasion upon which it has been used warrants its use in the manner resorted to. This view of the law, I find, is taken by the most distinguished writer upon the criminal law of modern days--that most acute thinker, Sir James Stephen. That learned judge, in his Digest of the Criminal Law, p. 105 submits the following as the true view of the law with reference to the publication of matter that would be obscene if not justified by the occasion: "A person (he says) is justified in exhibiting disgusting objects, or publishing obscene books, papers, writings, pictures, drawings, or other representations, if their exhibition or publication is for the public good, as being necessary or advantageous to religion of morality, to the administration of justice, the pursuit of science, literature or art, or other objects of general interest; but the justification ceases if the publication is made in such a manner, to such an extent, or under such circumstances, as to exceed what the public good requires in regard to the particular matter published."