At the same time it cannot be said that the latter were indifferent to the affairs of Italy. When, in 1627, the Dukes of Savoy and Guastalla, aided by the House of Austria, wished to secure to Charles de Gonzaga the Duke of Mantua’s inheritance, Louis XIII. loudly proclaimed the cause of this legitimate heir, and ensured the triumph of his rights. Rendered by victory master of the destiny of the House of Savoy, Richelieu did not allow himself to be dazzled by success. This incomparable politician understood that to dispossess an Italian dynasty and to establish himself on the other side of the Alps, would necessarily result in uniting the Italians to the Spaniards, in provoking against the French (who had suddenly become unpopular, even by their presence) a coalition sooner or later victorious, and creating, in fact, outside the natural sphere of action of France, incessant grounds of anxiety, jealousies, struggles, and alarms. Thus, in 1631, by the treaty of Cherasco, the skilful Minister, sacrificing many of the fruits of his victory, restored Piedmont and Savoy, contenting himself with retaining Pignerol, so as always to keep open one of the passes into Italy. To watch over her without alarming her, to be a protector of the rights of the Italian Princes without menacing their independence, to exact complete confidence from them in return, to baffle the intrigues of the Spaniards, and to allow them to accumulate on themselves hatred and resentment; to assume, in a word, an attitude passive yet vigilant, firm but not menacing, such was the judicious conduct of Richelieu towards Italy.