Louis XIV. long remained faithful to this policy. It was towards the North and East that he led his victorious armies, and by a succession of enterprises, happily conceived and wonderfully well-conducted, he extended the frontiers of France in the proper direction; and, arbitrator of Europe, at the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, and subsequently at that of Nimeguen, he inspired her with fear and admiration. In these two cities his will alone was the sole basis of the negotiations. While for every one the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle had never appeared to be aught but a truce, that of Nimeguen combined all the conditions of a definitive peace. But even before this famous treaty was signed, Louis XIV. had conceived ambitious projects on the other side of the Alps, and the possession of Pignerol and the neighbouring valleys no longer appeared to him sufficient for the part he was desirous of playing in Italy. The influence of his government had, however, been better accepted there, when it was more dissembled, and when everything that could give the slightest offence had been avoided with the greatest care. But, when the policy of Richelieu and Mazarin, scrupulously continued by De Lionne, had ceased to prevail--when the invading and impetuous Louvois established a sort of military diplomacy, which he directed as he pleased--the sentiments of the Italians, and in particular of the Piedmontese, became somewhat modified: confiding deference gave place to restrained apprehension, and led by degrees to a hatred which burst out against France at the moment she was oppressed by coalitions and defeats.