The general instructions to the pioneer force were precise: they were directed to select a place of landing, and then to inquire about the question of obtaining carriage and supplies from the natives (this last being Colonel Merewether’s special duty); and to Colonel Wilkins, R.E., was assigned specially to determine the adaptability of the shore for landing, the erection of piers, floating wharves, and shelter of all kinds; he was also ordered to advise upon the military value of positions selected, and to assist in general reconnoissance. But the point upon which above all others General Napier laid stress was, that the pioneer force should on no account push forward into the high land; he knew that there could be no possible utility in their so doing, and that it would entail a great and unnecessary labour to provision them at a distance from the sea, especially up so difficult a country. Both upon Colonel Merewether and Colonel Phayre did he impress this point. In his letter of the 9th October to the former officer he said, “_It is not at all intended that this force shall take up a position on the high ground_, for which its strength and composition are unfitted.” Farther on he says, “If news is satisfactory, Staveley’s brigade will sail, and _upon its arrival_ the advance may be made.” To Colonel Phayre he was equally explicit. In a letter to him dated 9th October he says, “_It is not of course intended that Colonel Field should move to the high table-land_ at Dexan, &c., but merely to take up such position as will cover the dépôt and protect the cattle.” And again farther on, “You will understand that it is _not my desire to precipitate a lodgment upon the table-land_, which we should have to maintain too long before advancing.” How these officers carried out the instructions thus clearly and strongly laid down, we shall see hereafter. It is needless now to enter into any detail of the preparations at Bombay, but it may be said that they were of the most extensive and complete character. Everything which could be thought of was provided for the health and comfort of the troops. Money was lavished like water; but, in the haste and bustle which prevailed, there is no question that the authorities were in many cases grossly imposed upon, and that stores were sent out of quality so utterly bad as to be perfectly useless. I may mention as an example the boots for the drivers of the transport train, which never lasted over a week, and very few of which attained even that comparatively respectable age. As with these, so with many other stores; but it is probable that cases of this sort are inseparable from a hastily-prepared expedition. The stores which were subsequently forwarded were very much better in quality. After these introductory remarks, I begin my narrative from the date of my own sailing from Bombay. THE MARCH TO MAGDALA.