The term of enlistment of the twelve months’ men was now rapidly drawing to a close, and to have an efficient army in the field when the spring campaign should open, it became necessary for the Confederate Government to take some steps to that end. An order was therefore issued some time in January, granting to all twelve months’ men who would re-enlist for the war, furloughs of from thirty to sixty days. The majority did so, and for the first time since entering the army, went home to see their families and friends. The unwise policy of the government in having enlisted men for a less time than the war here proved itself, and for a long while after occasioned much trouble and caused much demoralization in the army of General Johnston, for bitterly did those who were compelled to remain in camp by reason of their having enlisted for the war, complain of the injustice they believed had been done them. Particularly was this the case in the First Maryland, which contained several twelve months’ companies, two of which, Companies A and B, had re-enlisted almost to a man, and gone off on furlough; the others, Companies C, H and I, preferring to remain in the field until their time was up, when many of them proposed to go into the cavalry and artillery, they having a dislike for the infantry arm of the service. However, the war men became reconciled in a measure, and it was hoped nothing more would be heard of the matter; but in this we were mistaken, as will be seen hereafter. The Confederate army was now, owing to the depletion of regiments and brigades by furloughs, reduced to about twenty thousand men, whilst not an organized brigade could be found in the whole command. Of this condition of things the Federal authorities were soon apprised, and therefore, in the early part of March, 1862, an advance upon Manassas by the whole army under McClellan was determined upon. Having no facilities for the transportation of the immense quantities of stores gathered there, and unable to resist the overwhelming force of McClellan, there was no alternative left Johnston but to destroy his supplies and withdraw the army to the south bank of the Rappahannock. It was a sad necessity, and as the troops were guided on their way for many weary miles by the lurid flames from their burning buildings that seemed to lick the very heavens, all felt that the first battle of the war had proved more disastrous as a victory than would have been a defeat. There was no pretension to organization, and what had been but a few months before an organized and victorious army, now presented the appearance of an ungovernable mob, and entirely at the mercy of the enemy, should he have the enterprise and energy to pursue it.