The Mathematical Theory of RelativityEddington, Arthur Stanley, Sir
Science
The Mathematical Theory of Relativity
Eddington, Arthur Stanley, Sir
Relativity (Physics)
The principle of relativity goes still further. Even if the measuring-appliances
were standardised completely, the physical quantities would still
involve the properties of the constant standard. We have seen that the
world-condition or object which is surveyed can only be apprehended in our
knowledge as the sum total of all the measurements in which it can be
concerned; any \emph{intrinsic} property of the object must appear as a uniformity
or law in these measures. When one partner in the comparison is fixed and
the other partner varied widely, whatever is common to all the measurements
may be ascribed exclusively to the first partner and regarded as an intrinsic
property of it. Let us apply this to the converse comparison; that is to say,
keep the measuring-appliance constant or standardised, and vary as widely
as possible the objects measured---or, in simpler terms, make a particular
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kind of measurement in all parts of the field. Intrinsic properties of the
measuring-appliance should appear as uniformities or laws in these measures.
We are familiar with several such uniformities; but we have not generally
recognised them as properties of the measuring-appliance. We have called
them \emph{laws of nature}.
The development of physics is progressive, and as the theories of the
external world become crystallised, we often tend to replace the elementary
physical quantities defined through operations of measurement by theoretical
quantities believed to have a more fundamental significance in the external
world. Thus the \Foreign{vis viva} $mv^{2}$, which is immediately determinable by experiment,
becomes replaced by a generalised energy, virtually defined by having
the property of conservation; and our problem becomes inverted---we have
not to discover the properties of a thing which we have recognised in nature,
but to discover how to recognise in nature a thing whose properties we have
assigned. This development seems to be inevitable; but it has grave drawbacks
especially when theories have to be reconstructed. Fuller knowledge
may show that there is nothing in nature having precisely the properties
assigned; or it may turn out that the thing having these properties has
entirely lost its importance when the new theoretical standpoint is adopted\footnotemark.\footnotetext
{We shall see in \SecRef{59} that this has happened in the case of energy. The dead-hand of a
superseded theory continues to embarrass us, because in this case the recognised terminology
still has implicit reference to it. This, however, is only a slight drawback to set off against the
many advantages obtained from the classical generalisation of energy as a step towards the more
complete theory.}%
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