The Mathematicall Praeface to Elements of Geometrie of Euclid of MegaraDee, John
Philosophy
The Mathematicall Praeface to Elements of Geometrie of Euclid of Megara
Dee, John
Geometry -- Early works to 1800; Mathematics -- Early works to 1800; Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
All thinges which are, & haue beyng, are found vnder a triple diuersitie
generall. For, either, they are demed Supernaturall, Naturall, or, of a
third being. Thinges Supernaturall, are immateriall, simple,
indiuisible, incorruptible, & vnchangeable. Things Naturall, are
materiall, compounded, diuisible, corruptible, and chaungeable. Thinges
Supernaturall, are, of the minde onely, comprehended: Things Naturall,
of the sense exterior, ar hable to be perceiued. In thinges Naturall,
probabilitie and coniecture hath place: But in things Supernaturall,
chief demõstration, & most sure Science is to be had. By which
properties & comparasons of these two, more easily may be described, the
state, condition, nature and property of those thinges, which, we before
termed of a third being: which, by a peculier name also, are called
_Thynges Mathematicall_. For, these, beyng (in a maner) middle, betwene
thinges supernaturall and naturall: are not so absolute and excellent,
as thinges supernatural: Nor yet so base and grosse, as things naturall:
But are thinges immateriall: and neuerthelesse, by materiall things
hable somewhat to be signified. And though their particular Images, by
Art, are aggregable and diuisible: yet the generall _Formes_,
notwithstandyng, are constant, vnchaungeable, vntrãsformable, and
incorruptible. Neither of the sense, can they, at any tyme, be perceiued
or iudged. Nor yet, for all that, in the royall mynde of man, first
conceiued. But, surmountyng the imperfectiõ of coniecture, weenyng and
opinion: and commyng short of high intellectuall cõceptiõ, are the
Mercurial fruite of _Dianœticall_ discourse, in perfect imagination
subsistyng. A meruaylous newtralitie haue these thinges _Mathematicall_,
and also a straunge participatiõ betwene thinges supernaturall,
immortall, intellectual, simple and indiuisible: and thynges naturall,
mortall, sensible, compounded and diuisible. Probabilitie and sensible
prose, may well serue in thinges naturall: and is commendable: In
Mathematicall reasoninges, a probable Argument, is nothyng regarded: nor
yet the testimony of sense, any whit credited: But onely a perfect
demonstration, of truthes certaine, necessary, and inuincible:
vniuersally and necessaryly concluded: is allowed as sufficient for “an
Argument exactly and purely Mathematical.”
[Note the worde, Vnit, to expresse the Greke Monas,
& not Vnitie: as we haue all, commonly, till now, vsed.]
Of _Mathematicall_ thinges, are two principall kindes: namely, _Number_,
and _Magnitude_.
[Number.]
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