In the whole field of symbolic thought we are universally held both
to intend, to speak of, and to reach conclusions about--to know
in short--particular realities, without having in our subjective
consciousness any mind-stuff that resembles them even in a remote
degree. We are instructed about them by language which awakens no
consciousness beyond its sound; and we know WHICH realities they are by
the faintest and most fragmentary glimpse of some remote context they
may have and by no direct imagination of themselves. As minds may differ
here, let me speak in the first person. I am sure that my own current
thinking has WORDS for its almost exclusive subjective material, words
which are made intelligible by being referred to some reality that lies
beyond the horizon of direct consciousness, and of which I am only aware
as of a terminal MORE existing in a certain direction, to which the
words might lead but do not lead yet. The SUBJECT, or TOPIC, of the
words is usually something towards which I mentally seem to pitch them
in a backward way, almost as I might jerk my thumb over my shoulder to
point at something, without looking round, if I were only entirely sure
that it was there. The UPSHOT, or CONCLUSION, of the words is something
towards which I seem to incline my head forwards, as if giving assent to
its existence, tho all my mind's eye catches sight of may be some tatter
of an image connected with it, which tatter, however, if only endued
with the feeling of familiarity and reality, makes me feel that the
whole to which it belongs is rational and real, and fit to be let pass.
Here then is cognitive consciousness on a large scale, and yet what
it knows, it hardly resembles in the least degree. The formula last laid
down for our thesis must therefore be made more complete. We may
now express it thus: A PERCEPT KNOWS WHATEVER REALITY IT DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY OPERATES ON AND RESEMBLES; ACONCEPTUAL FEELING, OR THOUGHT
KNOWS A REALITY, WHENEVER IT ACTUALLY OR POTENTIALLY TERMINATES IN A
PERCEPT THAT OPERATES ON, OR RESEMBLES THAT REALITY, OR IS OTHERWISE
CONNECTED WITH IT OR WITH ITS CONTEXT. The latter percept may be either
sensation or sensorial idea; and when I say the thought must TERMINATE
in such a percept, I mean that it must ultimately be capable of leading
up thereto,--by the way of practical [missing section] is an incomplete
'thought about' that reality, that reality is its 'topic,' etc.
experience, if the terminal feeling be a sensation; by the way of
logical or habitual suggestion, if it be only an image in the mind.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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