What misleads so many of them is possibly also the fact that the universes of discourse of Schiller, Dewey, and myself are panoramas of different extent, and that what the one postulates explicitly the other provisionally leaves only in a state of implication, while the reader thereupon considers it to be denied. Schiller's universe is the smallest, being essentially a psychological one. He starts with but one sort of thing, truth-claims, but is led ultimately to the independent objective facts which they assert, inasmuch as the most successfully validated of all claims is that such facts are there. My universe is more essentially epistemological. I start with two things, the objective facts and the claims, and indicate which claims, the facts being there, will work successfully as the latter's substitutes and which will not. I call the former claims true. Dewey's panorama, if I understand this colleague, is the widest of the three, but I refrain from giving my own account of its complexity. Suffice it that he holds as firmly as I do to objects independent of our judgments. If I am wrong in saying this, he must correct me. I decline in this matter to be corrected at second hand. I have not pretended in the following pages to consider all the critics of my account of truth, such as Messrs. Taylor, Lovejoy, Gardiner, Bakewell, Creighton, Hibben, Parodi, Salter, Carus, Lalande, Mentre, McTaggart, G. E. Moore, Ladd and others, especially not Professor Schinz, who has published under the title of Anti-pragmatisme an amusing sociological romance. Some of these critics seem to me to labor under an inability almost pathetic, to understand the thesis which they seek to refute. I imagine that most of their difficulties have been answered by anticipation elsewhere in this volume, and I am sure that my readers will thank me for not adding more repetition to the fearful amount that is already there. 95 IRVING ST., CAMBRIDGE (MASS.), August, 1909. CONTENTS I THE FUNCTION OF COGNITION II THE TIGERS IN INDIA III HUMANISM AND TRUTH IV THE RELATION BETWEEN KNOWER AND KNOWN V THE ESSENCE OF HUMANISM VI A WORD MORE ABOUT TRUTH VII PROFESSOR PRATT ON TRUTH VIII THE PRAGMATIST ACCOUNT OF TRUTH AND ITS MIS-UNDERSTANDERS IX THE MEANING OF THE WORD TRUTH X THE EXISTENCE OF JULIUS CAESAR XI THE ABSOLUTE AND THE STRENUOUS LIFE XII PROFESSOR HEBERT ON PRAGMATISM XIII ABSTRACTIONISM AND 'RELATIVISMUS' XIV TWO ENGLISH CRITICS XV A DIALOGUE THE MEANING OF TRUTH I THE FUNCTION OF COGNITION [Footnote: Read before the Aristotelian Society, December 1, 1884, and first published in Mind, vol. x (1885).--This, and the following articles have received a very slight verbal revision, consisting mostly in the omission of redundancy.]