Cramp, Charles Henry, 1828-1913; Naval architects -- United States -- Biography
To go back a little, it may be worth while to remark here that the
national misfortune did not even end with the failure of these bills,
and the consequent continued depression or paralysis of the American
foreign carrying trade. There was from time to time sufficient prospect,
or at least possibility, of the passage of a practical and effective law
for the aid and encouragement of American shipping to induce the
investment of a large amount of capital by sanguine persons in new
ship-building plants of considerable magnitude, whereby the trade as it
stood was not only greatly overdone, but the skilled ship-building labor
of the country was overdrawn. There seemed to be a theory that plenty of
money to invest in plant or to sink in unprofitable enterprises could be
depended on to make up for the lack of experience in the management of
shipyards and want of skill in ship-building labor. The result was
disastrous not only to the investors in the stock and bonds of the new
shipyards, but also to the entire ship-building industry, as it had been
developed on a practical and legitimate basis.
With the final failure of all legislation to promote American commerce
in the foreign carrying trade, there was no resource left for either the
new shipyards or the old except such work as the coastwise trade might
provide and the construction of naval vessels. As for the coastwise
trade, it was already well provided with new and highly serviceable
steamships likely to fill the demands of the traffic for several years
to come, so that little or no new work could be expected from that
quarter.
The naval programme did not in any year put forward as many ships as
there were ship-yards. The government itself seemed to adopt the policy
of fostering and promoting the new shipyards at the expense of the old,
whereby the former were overloaded with work which they could not do,
and they invariably became so hopelessly delinquent as to make the time
clause of the contracts an utter farce. New shipyards, which had never
completed a ship of any description, were loaded with 15,000 and
16,000-ton battleships of the most complex and difficult construction,
requiring the highest skill and the most approved experience in every
respect to carry on the work required for their completion.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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