Soc. Again, suppose he deceives the foe while at war with them? Euth. That would be all fair and right also. Soc. Or steals and pillages their property? would he not be doing what is right? Euth. Certainly; when you began I thought you were limiting the question to the case of friends. Soc. So then everything which we set down on the side of Wrong will now have to be placed to the credit of Right? Euth. Apparently. Soc. Very well then, let us so place them; and please, let us make a new definition--that while it is right to do such things to a foe, it is wrong to do them to a friend, but in dealing with the latter it behoves us to be as straightforward as possible. (29) (29) Or, "an absolutely straightforward course is necessary." I quite assent (replied Euthydemus). So far so good (remarked Socrates); but if a general, seeing his troops demoralised, were to invent a tale to the effect that reinforcements were coming, and by means of this false statement should revive the courage of his men, to which of the two accounts shall we place that act of fraud? (30) (30) Cf. "Hell." IV. iii. 10; "Cyrop." I. vi. 31. On the side of right, to my notion (he replied). Soc. Or again, if a man chanced to have a son ill and in need of medicine, which the child refused to take, and supposing the father by an act of deceit to administer it under the guise of something nice to eat, and by service of that lie to restore the boy to health, to which account shall we set down this fraud? Euth. In my judgment it too should be placed to the same account. Soc. Well, supposing you have a friend in deplorably low spirits, and you are afraid he will make away with himself--accordingly you rob him of his knife or other such instrument: to which side ought we to set the theft? Euth. That too must surely be placed to the score of right behaviour. Soc. I understand you to say that a straightforward course is not in every case to be pursued even in dealing with friends? Heaven forbid! (the youth exclaimed). If you will allow me, I rescind my former statement. (31) (31) See above, I. ii. 44 ({anatithemai}). Soc. Allow you! Of course you may--anything rather than make a false entry on our lists.... But there is just another point we ought not to leave uninvestigated. Let us take the case of deceiving a friend to his detriment: which is the more wrongful--to do so voluntarily or unintentionally? Euth. Really, Socrates, I have ceased to believe in my own answers, for all my former admissions and conceptions seem to me other than I first supposed them. (32) Still, if I may hazard one more opinion, the intentional deceiver, I should say, is worse than the involuntary. (32) Or, "all my original positions seem to me now other than I first conceived them"; or, "everything I first asserted seems now to be twisted topsy-turvy." Soc. And is it your opinion that there is a lore and science of Right and Justice just as there is of letters and grammar? (33)