4. _i.e._ either simply Happiness, or certain objective relations of the Conscious Mind. 398-400 5. When these alternatives are fairly presented, Common Sense seems disposed to choose the former: especially as we can now explain its instinctive disinclination to admit Pleasure as ultimate end: while the other alternative leaves us without a criterion for determining the comparative value of different elements of ‘Good.’ 400-407 BOOK IV UTILITARIANISM CHAPTER I THE MEANING OF UTILITARIANISM 1. The ethical theory called Utilitarianism, or Universalistic Hedonism, is to be carefully distinguished from Egoistic Hedonism: and also from any psychological theory as to the nature and origin of the Moral Sentiments. 411-413 2. The notion of ‘Greatest Happiness’ has been determined in Book ii. chap. i.: but the extent and manner of its application require to be further defined. Are we to include all Sentient Beings? and is it Total or Average Happiness that we seek to make a maximum? We also require a supplementary Principle for _Distribution_ of Happiness: the principle of Equality is _prima facie_ reasonable. 413-417 CHAPTER II THE PROOF OF UTILITARIANISM Common Sense demands a Proof of the first Principle of this method, more clearly than in the case of Egoism and Intuitionism. Such a proof, addressed to the Egoistic Hedonist, was in fact given in Book iii. chap. xiii. § 3: it exhibited the essence of the Utilitarian Principle as a clear and certain moral Intuition. But it is also important to examine its relation to other received maxims. 418-422 CHAPTER III THE RELATION OF UTILITARIANISM TO THE MORALITY OF COMMON SENSE 1. Taking as our basis Hume’s exhibition of the Virtues as Felicific qualities of character, we can trace a complex coincidence between Utilitarianism and Common Sense. It is not needful--nor does it even help the argument--to show this coincidence to be perfect and exact. 423-426 2. We may observe, first, that Dispositions may often be admired (as generally felicific) when the special acts that have resulted from them are infelicific. Again, the maxims of many virtues are found to contain an explicit or implicit reference to Duty conceived as already determinate. Passing over these to examine the more definite among common notions of Duty: 426-430