Let us therefore first ask, Of what kind of laws is the observance
generally thought to be a realisation of Justice? In most cases they
might be described as laws which define and secure the interests of
assignable individuals. But this description is not complete, as
Justice is admittedly concerned in the apportionment of adequate
punishment to each offender; though we should not say that a man had
an interest in the adequacy of his punishment. Let us say, then,
that the laws in which Justice is or ought to be realised, are laws
which distribute and allot to individuals either objects of desire,
liberties and privileges, or burdens and restraints, or even pains
as such. These latter, however, are only allotted by law to persons
who have broken other laws. And as all law is enforced by penalties,
we see how the administration of law generally may be viewed as
the administration of Justice, in accordance with this definition:
not because all laws are primarily and in their first intention
distributive, but because the execution of law generally involves
the due allotment of pains and losses and restraints to the persons
who violate it. Or, more precisely, we should say that this legal
distribution _ought_ to realise Justice, for we have seen that it
may fail to do so. We have next to ask, therefore, What conditions
must laws fulfil in order that they may be just in their distributive
effects?
Here, however, it may seem that we are transgressing the limit which
divides Ethics from Politics: for Ethics is primarily concerned with
the rules which ought to govern the private conduct of individuals;
and it is commonly thought that private persons ought to obey even
laws that they regard as unjust, if established by lawful authority.
Still, this is doubted in the case of laws that seem extremely unjust:
as (_e.g._) the Fugitive Slave law in the United States before the
rebellion. At any rate it seems desirable that we should here digress
somewhat into political discussion; partly in order to elucidate
the notion of Justice, which seems to be essentially the same in
both regions, and partly because it is of great practical importance
to individuals, in regulating private conduct beyond the range of
Law-observance, to know whether the laws and established order of the
society in which they live are just or unjust.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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