Now perhaps the most obvious and commonly recognised characteristic
of just laws is that they are Equal: and in some departments of
legislation, at least, the common notion of Justice seems to be
exhaustively expressed by that of Equality. It is commonly thought,
for example, that a system of taxation would be perfectly just if it
imposed exactly equal burdens upon all:[206] and though this notion
of ‘equal burden’ is itself somewhat difficult to define with the
precision required for practical application, still we may say that
Justice here is thought to resolve itself into a kind of equality.
However, we cannot affirm generally that all laws ought to affect all
persons equally, for this would leave no place for any laws allotting
special privileges and burdens to special classes of the community;
but we do not think all such laws necessarily unjust: _e.g._ we think
it not unjust that only persons appointed in a certain way should
share in legislation, and that men should be forced to fight for their
country but not women. Hence some have said that the only sense in
which justice requires a law to be equal is that its execution must
affect equally all the individuals belonging to any of the classes
specified in the law. And no doubt this rule excludes a very real
kind of injustice: it is of the highest importance that judges and
administrators should never be persuaded by money or otherwise to
show ‘respect of persons.’ So much equality, however, is involved
in the very notion of a law, if it be couched in general terms:
and it is plain that laws may be equally executed and yet unjust:
for example, we should consider a law unjust which compelled only
red-haired men to serve in the army, even though it were applied with
the strictest impartiality to all red-haired men. We must therefore
conclude, that, in laying down the law no less than in carrying it
out, all inequality[207] affecting the interests of individuals which
appears arbitrary, and for which no sufficient reason can be given,
is held to be unjust. But we have still to ask, what kind of reasons
for inequality Justice admits and from what general principle (or
principles) all such reasons are to be deduced?
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account