E-text prepared by Curtis Weyant, Sankar Viswanathan, and the Project Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images generously made available by Digital Case, the Kelvin Smith Library, Case Western Reserve University (http://library.case.edu/digitalcase/) Note: Images of the original pages are available through Digital Case, the Kelvin Smith Library, Case Western Reserve University. See http://digitalcase.case.edu:9000/fedora/get/ksl:binmin00/binmin00.pdf Transcriber's Note: References are made to footnotes in other footnotes and index. The footnotes are serially numbered and placed at the end of each chapter. Consequently the references in the footnotes and index have been corrected to indicate the footnote number. International Scientific Series. Volume LXXXIX. (The International Scientific Series) Edited by F. Legge THE MIND AND THE BRAIN by ALFRED BINET Directeur du Laboratoire de Psychologie a la Sorbonne Being the Authorised Translation of _L'Ame et le Corps_ London Kegan Paul, Trench, Truebner & Co. Ltd Dryden House, Gerrard Street, W. 1907 CONTENTS BOOK I THE DEFINITION OF MATTER CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The distinction between mind and matter--Knowable not homogeneous--Criterion employed, enumeration not concepts CHAPTER II OUR KNOWLEDGE OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS ONLY SENSATION Modern theories of matter--Outer world only known to us by our sensations--Instances--Mill's approval of proposition, and its defects--Nervous system only intermediary between self and outer world--The great X of Matter--Nervous system does not give us true image--Mueller's law of specificity of the nerves--The nervous system itself a sensation--Relations of sensation with the unknowable the affair of metaphysics CHAPTER III THE MECHANICAL THEORIES OF MATTER ARE ONLY SYMBOLS Physicists vainly endeavour to reduce the role of sensation--Mathematical, energetical, and mechanical theories of universe--Mechanical model formed from sensation--Instance of tuning-fork--No one sensation any right to hegemony over others CHAPTER IV ANSWERS TO SOME OBJECTIONS, AND SUMMARY Objections of spiritualists--Of German authors who contend that nervous system does give true image--Of metaphysicians--Common ground of objection that nervous system not intermediary--Answer to this--Summary of preceding chapters BOOK II THE DEFINITION OF MIND CHAPTER I THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COGNITION AND ITS OBJECT Necessity for inventory of mental phenomena--Objects of cognition and acts of cognition--Definition of consciousness CHAPTER II DEFINITION OF SENSATION Sensation defined by experimental psychology--A state of consciousness--Considered self-evident by Mill, Renouvier, and Hume--Psycho-physical according to Reid and Hamilton--Reasons in favour of last definition--Other opinions examined and refuted CHAPTER III DEFINITION OF THE IMAGE