Thus it would seem that the obstacles to generalized thought inherent in the form of a language are of minor importance only, and that presumably language alone would not prevent a people from advancing to more generalized forms of thinking, if the general state of their culture should require expression of such thought; that under these conditions, the language would be moulded rather by the cultural state. It does not seem likely, therefore, that there is any direct relation between the culture of a tribe and the language they speak, except in so far as the form of the language will be moulded by the state of culture, but not in so far as a certain state of culture is conditioned by morphological traits of the language. Thus we have found that language does not furnish the much-looked-for means of discovering differences in the mental status of different races. ----- Footnote 3: See map in Handbook of American Indians (Bulletin 30 of the Bureau of American Ethnology), part i (1907). Footnote 4: This must not be understood to mean that every primitive language is in a constant state of rapid modification. There are many evidences of a great permanence of languages. When, however, owing to certain outer or inner causes, changes set in, they are apt to bring about a thorough modification of the form of speech. Footnote 5: The Kwakiutl of Vancouver Island. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ VI. THE UNIVERSALITY OF CULTURAL TRAITS THERE remains one question to be discussed; namely, whether some tribes represent a lower cultural stage when looked at from an evolutionary point of view. Our previous discussion has shown that almost all attempts to characterize the mind of primitive man do not take into account racial affiliations, but only stages of culture, and the results of our efforts to determine characteristic racial differences have been of doubtful value. It appears, therefore, that modern anthropologists not only proceed on the assumption of the generic unity of the mind of man, but tacitly disregard quantitative differences which may very well occur. We may therefore base our further considerations on the theory of the similarity of mental functions in all races. Observation has shown, however, that not only emotions, intellect, and will-power of man are alike everywhere, but that much more detailed similarities in thought and action occur among the most diverse peoples. These similarities are apparently so detailed and far-reaching, that Bastian was led to speak of the appalling monotony of the fundamental ideas of mankind all over the globe. Thus it has been found that the metaphysical notions of man may be reduced to a few types which are of universal distribution. The same is the case in regard to the forms of society, laws, and inventions.