As a matter of fact, this system of delegated authority, of limited grants of real power, seems to run through all nature. The Commander-in-Chief leaves certain details to his generals; the generals leave certain details to their captains, the captains to their lieutenants. The private soldier has his particular duty to perform. And each one is held responsible for the performance of his own duty within his own limited sphere of action--a duty which he is free to perform or to leave undone. Whenever an individual is rewarded or punished for something which he was not free to do or not to do, our natures recoil from what we term an “injustice.” With no free will at all, any reward or punishment would be unjust. And it is to this sort of a world our materialistic psychologists and philosophers have been trying to introduce us. No wonder they shied away from the conception of consciousness. Sentience without freedom seems unjust. Even with limited freedom, it seems unjust. Man’s sense of justice, therefore, has compelled him to regard this life as a fragment; to say that only willfully endured or provoked pains and privations are deserved, to believe in another life beyond the grave without waiting for further proof of it. Thus Dante was constrained to write even over the gates of Hell, “_Giustizia mosse ’l mio Alto Fattore_.”[105] If we return now to the doctrine of probabilities and to Lillie we shall find him nodding, for he says: “It already seems clear that many of the physical laws with which we are familiar in the realm of microscopic phenomena cease to apply on the scale where events are determined by the ‘chance’ fluctuations of molecular movement.” Chance here is clearly not the proper word. It contradicts his whole argument. Obviously he is using it in a very loose sense--much as behaviorists use it when they say that the first synapse between dendrite and axone in the brain is chance-determined. As a mathematician he must know that these isolated phenomena of the exceedingly minute are precisely those to which the law of probabilities cannot be applied. As much cannot be said of the behaviorists. Their attaching of the word “chance” to the word “synapse” is due to no slip of the pen, but rather to some regrettable individual action behind the synapse itself. “Ultra-microscopic phenomena,” Lillie goes on, in a way which quite confirms the foregoing explanation of his lapse, “thus give evidence ... of control by individual action rather than by statistical or mass action. The laws relating to such [microscopic] action ... assuming such laws to exist ... are as yet imperfectly known. But they are certainly entirely different from physical laws.” This may seem remarkable, but after all it is only what we should have expected. In the ultra-microscopic world we are approaching individual action and leaving mass action, the average action of many individuals, behind. The illusion of bondage begins to disappear.