But let us call to the stand a distinguished witness as to the reality of the choice having been made. Chance leads me to select Prof. C. H. Warren, whose “A Study of Purpose” was first published in the _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method_.[10] It chances that I have access to certain passages from this paper. Also he happens not to be a thoroughgoing behaviorist, as may be seen from the fact that he speaks of “purposive action” and of “ideas.” Bertrand Russell is of the opinion that there is only one thoroughgoing behaviorist in the world--Dr. Watson, to wit. I even hope to show that Dr. Watson steps out of his rôle in certain desperate pinches. But Prof. Warren is sufficiently mechanistic to warrant his being heard. He says: “The notion of purpose arose from a certain definite type of human experience. The typical purposive experience consists of a thought of some future occurrence followed by a series of actions which culminate in the very situation which the original idea represented. A human act is said to be purposive when it is preceded by an idea representing the situation which the act itself brings about.” Not quite as clear as a crystal, but it means that I light my pipe, not because I want to smoke but because I foresee that I will light it. Dr. Watson says practically the same thing, only he points out that the motions which provoke desire are small, observable only by means of instruments. “Visceral phenomena,” for instance. And he makes the statement thoroughly behavioristic by adding that these visceral phenomena _are_ desire, the only kind of desire which exists. But causes must precede effect, so Prof. Warren is trying to make “foreknowledge” serve for the needed something to touch off the visceral phenomena and bring desire into being. He goes on to describe how he turns on the electric light in his study--not because he wants to read, but because he foresees that he is going to press the button and that then there will be light--in a physical sense, at least. He admits “desire” into the realm of being only after the action has begun, and explains it as a “kinesthetic image,”--that is, an image derived from the muscular sense. Which means that he begins to want to read, and that I begin to want to smoke, only after our muscles are on the way to produce smoke and light in available quantities. And he further testifies. “If the thought of an action leads to the production of that particular action ... rather than to any one of the thousands of other kinesthetic experiences, the reason is that a definite association has previously been formed between this particular thought and this particular impulse. The origin of such an association _may be attributed to chance occurrence_.”