There is also but one broken vase. And it, too, is the cause of our being aware of it. Cat and vase are evidently of the same order of things to the extent that they both have an existence within the beholder (which the beholder knows through consciousness), and a certain inferred existence of their own. But how about the emotion awakened by the broken vase? Has that an existence independent of those experiencing it? Ever since the days of ancient Greece, and probably since long before, certain philosophers have been trying to prove that not even the cat has such an outside existence. Things exist only in the philosopher’s mind, and therefore the one thing which exists is the philosopher. The only way to refute this theory is by using your brains to an extent sufficient to arrive at the conclusion that, since some of the things you see look amazingly like yourself, and react much as you do to yet other things, then it is at least highly probable that these other people and other things actually are. Now the behaviorist’s contention is merely the reverse of this all-in-the-mind theory--and is equally absurd. To him there is nothing in the mind; there is no mind. Instead of all being inside, all is outside. Yet Dr. Watson considers himself privileged to speak not only of emotions and emotion-reflexes, but of “purpose,” “failure,” and “success.” We begin with “random” squirms, he says, and now and then one of these “random” squirms is “successful,” it accomplishes its “object.” Unconscious “seeking motions” are continued until they are “satisfied.” Such expressions are to be found scattered through all his writings. But a seeking motion must be a motion which seeks something. If the babe be unconscious, how does it know when the seeking has been successful? Does it move in hopes of finding pleasure or of avoiding pain? It can feel neither pleasure nor pain. Does it squirm to improve its general welfare? That is what the tropism theory assumes. But without consciousness there can be no such thing as welfare. It makes no slightest difference to the organism what happens to it, whether it lives or dies. Our unconscious Eliza refuses to cross the ice, even when bayed at by an unconscious bloodhound. There is no reason why she should. An unconscious Eliza would be as comfortable inside of a bloodhound as anywhere else. And an unconscious bloodhound is as comfortable fasting as when fed. Nevertheless, Dr. Watson, who is “not concerned with problems of consciousness,” is about to introduce us to language, morality and reform! 4. TINKS! TINKS! KWAKS! KWAKS!