There can be no doubt that something is directly known but disputes break out as soon as we try to say what that something is. Is it the “real” world of material objects, or a mental copy of these objects, or are we altogether on the wrong track in looking for two kinds of realities, the “real” world and “our mental states,” and is it perceived events alone that are “real?” This something which we know directly has been given various names: “the external object,” “sense data,” “phenomena,” and so on, each more or less coloured by implications belonging to one or other of the rival theories as to what it is. We shall call it “the facts” to emphasise its indubitable reality, and avoid, as far as possible, any other implications. Controversy about “the facts” has been mainly as to what position they occupy in the total scheme of reality. As to what they are at the moment when we are actually being acquainted with them one would have thought there could have been no two opinions; it seems impossible that we should make any mistake about that. No doubt it is impossible to have such a thing as a false experience, an experience is what it is, only judgments can be false. But it is quite possible to make a false judgment as to what experience we are actually having, or, still more commonly, simply to take for granted that our experience must be such and such, without ever looking to see whether it is or not. A small child taken to a party and told that parties are great fun if questioned afterwards will very likely say it has enjoyed itself though, if you happened to have been there, you may have seen clearly that it was really bewildered or bored. Even when we grow up names still have a tendency to impose upon us and disguise from us the actual nature of our experiences. There are not very many people who, if invited to partake, for instance, of the last bottle of some famous vintage wine, would have the courage to admit, even to themselves, that it was nasty, even though it was, in fact, considerably past its prime. Cases of this kind, with which we are all familiar, are enough to make us realize that it is actually quite possible to make mistakes even about facts which we know directly, to overlook the actual fact altogether because we have made up our minds in advance as to what it is sure to be.