Since Descartes, says our author, real and possible consciousness constitutes the true limits of the province of psychic research, the fundamental problem of psychology, and the characteristic distinction between the old and new philosophy. But, in order to find out, whether this tendency of the new philosophy has been entirely successful, it will be necessary to examine more closely the nature of the fundamental psychic phenomenon, and the problem that it involves. In the fact of consciousness we can distinguish several elements which really are inseparable, but which in the study of the problem ought to be separated. There is the content of which one is conscious, and secondly, the consciousness thereof, or its relation to the ego; and, by a further abstraction, this relation itself might be distinguished from the total fact of consciousness. The relation to the ego, in ever varied contents, is one and the same; it makes up both the common and specific element of consciousness, and as the third abstract element of consciousness (Bewusstsein) it might aptly be called self-consciousness (Bewusstheit). The ego, being a common point of relation to all contents of consciousness, cannot itself become the content of consciousness, because it represents a contrast to any idea of content. We do not correctly conceive consciousness as a thing, a cause, a force, an explanatory principle, but simply as a phenomenon—the fundamental phenomenon of psychology. We thereupon ask, what contains this phenomenon, and by what is it characterised? It is, above all, characterised by _subjective_ experience. This denotes, that it is _I_ who am conscious of a content. The reflective expression "I am conscious" implies a "subject" that is conscious. Without this reflective relation to the ego, consciousness no longer conveys any meaning. Consciousness denotes _self_-consciousness. This reflective relation is therefore the only distinctive mark of all conscious phenomena. Content we call anything that can be related to the ego. In the language adopted by psychologists, a feeling or a desire can also be regarded as content of consciousness. But our investigation cannot proceed beyond this reflective relation. If we attempt a _representation_ of the ego, we should turn it into _object_, and we should have ceased to regard it as _ego_. The ego is never an object—not even to itself. It is not denied, that in every consciousness there can be distinguished two elements—the existence of a content, and its relation to the ego; but it is denied, that this relation can be made objective, even to itself. This correctly describes the character of consciousness, as content and activity, and moreover, precisely delimits the domain of the psychical and determines the _positive_ task of psychology. Those, who assume a consciousness of consciousness, ought logically to admit the consciousness of a consciousness of consciousness, etc.; as indeed some metaphysicians have done.