The Monist, Vol. 1, 1890-1891 : $b A quarterly magazine — John Shaqi
The Monist, Vol. 1, 1890-1891 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 1, 1890-1891 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
Colors, sounds, temperatures, pressures, spaces, times, and the like,
are united with one another in the most manifold ways; and to these are
joined moods of mind, feelings, and wills. Out of this complication,
that which is relatively the more fixed and the more permanent stands
prominently forth, engraves itself in the memory, and expresses itself
in language. As relatively more permanent appear, first, _complexes_
of colors, sounds, pressures, and so forth, that are connected in time
and space, that therefore receive special names, and are designated as
_bodies_. Such complexes are by no means absolutely permanent.
My table is now brightly and now darkly lighted. It may be warmer or
colder. It may receive an ink stain. One of its legs may get broken. It
can be repaired, polished, and replaced part for part. But for me, amid
all, it remains the table at which I daily write.
My friend can put on a different coat. His countenance can assume a
serious or joyful expression. The complexion of his face, under the
effects of light or of emotion, can change. His shape can be altered by
a movement, or can be permanently transformed. But the sum total of the
permanent, as compared with gradual alterations of this kind, always
remains so great, that the latter vanish. It is the same friend with
whom I take my daily walk.
My coat can receive a stain, a tear. The very manner of my expression
indicates that the gist of the thing is a quantity of permanency, to
which the new element is added and from which that which is lacking is
subsequently deducted.
Our greater intimacy with this quantity of permanency, and its
preponderance as contrasted with the changeable, impel us to the
partly instinctive, partly voluntary and conscious economy of mental
representation and designation which is expressed in ordinary thought
and speech. That which has been _once_ perceptually represented
receives _a single_ designation, _a single_ name.
As relatively permanent, is exhibited, further, that complex of
memories, moods, and feelings, joined to a particular body (the human
body), which is denominated the "I" or "Ego." I can be engaged with
this subject or with that subject, I can be quiet or animated, excited
or ill-humoured. Yet—pathological cases not considered—enough that is
permanent remains to recognise the ego as the same. Moreover, the ego
also is only of relative permanency.
* * * * *
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account