[3] It should be understood that in the previous discussion so far as it relates to Kant, I have taken him at his lowest terms—those of logical self-consistency. So far as Kant does not succeed in freeing himself from his original position—the existence of a formal, or apart, faculty of thought—so far his emphasis of the _a priori_ in the sense already attributed to him is inevitable. But that the _tendency_ of Kant is to make the thought-relations _a priori_ simply in the sense of being fact’s own anatomy and physiognomy I should not deny. WILL AND REASON. It has always been, I think, the practice in civilised society to speak of reason or good sense as in some way influencing action. And of course it must do so, if, as we suppose, it forms the radical distinction between man and the lower animals. “Be reasonable,” we say, in reference to action no less than to speculation. “Wisdom and blood,” says Shakespeare, “combating in so tender a body, we have ten proofs to one that blood hath the victory.” Blood here means passion. How does wisdom or knowledge combat passion? I do not say that wisdom and knowledge mean the same thing, but if they do not, we should like to know the difference between them. In this prevalent notion of the conflict between reason and desire, it may be observed that reason is, as a rule, supposed to be negative or prohibitive. “Be reasonable” generally means “give up something you want very much.” According to one account, the inward monitor of Socrates was always negative, and throughout moral philosophy, and especially throughout moralising philosophy, which is not quite the same thing, you find the point of view that reason conflicts with desire, and has in fact for its function very much to prevent you doing or caring about whatever you very particularly want to do or incline to care about. This is what gives rise to the state of things satirised in the old saying “Any young man would rather face an imputation on his moral character than an imputation on his horsemanship.” If moral character means a sort of detachment from everything, this feeling is both natural and justifiable. The popular interpretation of Aristotle leans in the direction of this idea about reason, in so far as the conception of the reason seems to be connected with commonplace notions about the evils of excess, strongly represented in Greek proverbial philosophy. It was easy to add to these ideas the conception of the evils of defect, which is little more than a verbal refinement on the other. These quantitative expressions have not much meaning in morality. Unquestionably, I think, the popular aspect of the Aristotelian doctrine is an idea that you ought not to throw yourself very deeply into anything. Reason is, in short, according to these moralistic conceptions, though not according to Aristotle’s fundamental view, a sort of check upon desire and little more.