The Monist, Vol. 3, 1892-1893 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 3, 1892-1893 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
But what is to be said of the property of feeling? If consciousness
belongs to all protoplasm, by what mechanical constitution is this to
be accounted for? The slime is nothing but a chemical compound. There
is no inherent impossibility in its being formed synthetically in the
laboratory, out of its chemical elements; and if it were so made, it
would present all the characters of natural protoplasm. No doubt,
then, it would feel. To hesitate to admit this would be puerile and
ultra-puerile. By what element of the molecular arrangement, then, would
that feeling be caused? This question cannot be evaded or pooh-poohed.
Protoplasm certainly does feel; and unless we are to accept a weak
dualism, the property must be shown to arise from some peculiarity of
the mechanical system. Yet the attempt to deduce it from the three laws
of mechanics, applied to never so ingenious a mechanical contrivance,
would obviously be futile. It can never be explained, unless we admit
that physical events are but degraded or undeveloped forms of psychical
events. But once grant that the phenomena of matter are but the result
of the sensibly complete sway of habits upon mind, and it only remains
to explain why in the protoplasm these habits are to some slight extent
broken up, so that according to the law of mind, in that special clause
of it sometimes called the principle of accommodation,[8] feeling becomes
intensified. Now the manner in which habits generally get broken up is
this. Reactions usually terminate in the removal of a stimulus; for the
excitation continues as long as the stimulus is present. Accordingly,
habits are general ways of behavior which are associated with the removal
of stimuli. But when the expected removal of the stimulus fails to occur,
the excitation continues and increases, and non-habitual reactions take
place; and these tend to weaken the habit. If, then, we suppose that
matter never does obey its ideal laws with absolute precision, but that
there are almost insensible fortuitous departures from regularity, these
will produce, in general, equally minute effects. But protoplasm is
in an excessively unstable condition; and it is the characteristic of
unstable equilibrium, that near that point excessively minute causes may
produce startlingly large effects. Here then, the usual departures from
regularity will be followed by others that are very great; and the large
fortuitous departures from law so produced, will tend still further to
break up the laws, supposing that these are of the nature of habits.
Now, this breaking up of habit and renewed fortuitous spontaneity will,
according to the law of mind, be accompanied by an intensification of
feeling. The nerve-protoplasm is, without doubt, in the most unstable
condition of any kind of matter; and consequently, there the resulting
feeling is the most manifest.
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