The Monist, Vol. 3, 1892-1893 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 3, 1892-1893 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
The two examples now given are cases of the _conjugative_ kind. The
relationship is a conjugative one and the relations are conjugative
relations. The distinguishing characteristic of a conjugative case is the
fact essentially involved of the mediation between relational elements
by another certain element, or in other words the bringing of diverse
relational elements into relation by the function of another relational
element. Without the mediation or function of this conjugating element
neither the relationship nor the conjugative relations can exist. There
is reason to believe that all conjugative cases can be certified as cases
of three relational elements or as compounds of a number of such sets of
three. To ordinary uncritical thought which is largely constrained by
the trammels of ordinary language the most abundant sort of relations
appears to be of that sort that are taken to involve only two relational
elements. These are cases of what are called _dual_ relationships and the
relations that arise out of them are called _dual_ relations. Such are
those like father, son, husband, wife, etc. Strictly viewed they ought to
be regarded as _degenerate_ relationships and relations just as a pair of
lines is regarded as a degenerate conic.
VIII. CAUTIONS AND APPLICATIONS.
Now besides the error of confounding relations with relationship, it is
a very common fault to think and speak of a relation as being _between_
two or more terms. This imports into thought the thoroughly misleading
idea of an intervening independent existence for relations. Relations are
attributive predicates of terms and each one of them pertains strictly to
its proper term or combination of terms, in the same sense for this turn
(_pro hac vice_) that qualities are held to pertain to their so-called
substances. And yet relations so pertain to their proper terms not in
virtue of such terms separately but in virtue of their membership in
the plural fact which obtains as the _relationship_ or _foundation_.
The notion of a relation as a “betweenness” has perhaps been fostered
by the exact coincidence of relations pertaining to the several members
of the same relationship. When on contemplating the connection, say
of two points, we observe that the distance of one from the other is
apparently indistinguishable from the distance of the other from the one,
we naturally overlook the fact that we are truly to regard the connection
as the coincidence of two really distinct relations, and regarding the
pair of relations as one thing and finding it not attributable to one
point more than to the other we dissociate it from both. But when we
consider a pair of relations that are converse to one another and that
arise out of a dual relationship like that of husband and wife we may see
that there is _no_ betweenness, no single relation that interlies, but
two relations, one the relation of husband and the other the converse
relation of wife.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account