The dependence of value on life, 9. Definition of the simpler terms of value. Goodness: the fulfilment of interest, 11. "Good" and "good for," 12. III. MORAL GOODNESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 The moral organization of life, 13. Definition of the terms of moral value. Moral goodness: the fulfilment of an economy of interests, 15. Moral goodness and pleasure, 16. Rightness or virtue, 18. Morality and life, 19. IV. MORALITY AND NATURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 The alleged artificiality of morality, 20. Morality and the struggle for existence, 21. Morality and adaptation, 22. Morality is natural if life is, 24. V. MORALITY AND CONFLICT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Morality and competitive struggle. Morality the condition of strength, 24. The value of conflict, 23. The elimination of conflict, 26. Morality and the love of life, 27. VI. THE DIGNITY AND LUSTRE OF MORALITY . . . . . . . . . . . 28 The effect of war on sentiment and the imagination, 28. Real power is constructive, not destructive or repressive, 29. Moral heroism, 31. The saving or provident character of morality, 32. Morality and the consummation of life, 33. CHAPTER II THE LOGIC OF THE MORAL APPEAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 I. THE STAND-POINT OF RATIONALISM AND INDIVIDUALISM . . . . 34 Modern individualism, 34. Distinguished from scepticism, 36. The individual as the organ of knowledge, 37. Moral individualism as a protest against convention, 39. Duty as the rational ground of action, 40. Reasonableness a condition of the consciousness of duty, 41. II. THE LOGIC OF PRUDENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Prudence as elementary, 43. Interest, action, and goodness, 43. The alleged relativity of goodness, 43. The conflict of interests solved by conciliation, 48. The limits of prudence, 49. III. THE LOGIC OF PREFERENCE AND PURPOSE . . . . . . . . . . 50 The adoption of new interests and the problem of preference, 50. A hypothetical solution of the problem, 51. Solution in the concrete case through the organization of a purpose, 53. The principle of the objective validity of interests, 54. The principle of the quantitative basis of preference, 55. IV. THE LOGIC OF IMPARTIALITY AND JUSTICE . . . . . . . . . 57 The private interest, 57. The personal factor negligible in counting interests, 58. The refutation of egoism. The first proposition of egoism, 59. The second proposition of egoism, 61. Impartiality as a part of justice, 63. Justice as imputing finality to the individual, 64. The equality of rational beings as organs of truth, 64. Summary of justice, 66. V. THE LOGIC OF GOOD-WILL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 All interests are entitled to consideration, 67. Goodwill and the growth of new interests, 67.