Recurring to the consideration of the reality of spirit-realms as compared with that of sensible space, it comes to view that our idealism, that is, the idealism which is a quality of conceptualization, may be regarded as identical with their realism, at least as being on the same plane as it. Stated differently, the things that are ideal to us and which constitute the data of our consciousness may be as real to them as the commonest object of sense-knowledge is to us. What, therefore, appears to us as the most ethereal and idealistic may have quite a realistic character for them. Ultimately, however, and in the final deeps of analysis it will be found undoubtedly that both our realism and our idealism as well as similar qualities of the spirit world are in all essential considerations quite illusionary. All knowledge gained in a condition short of divinity itself is sadly relative. Even mathematical knowledge falls far short of the absolute, the fondest claims of the orthodox mathematician to the contrary notwithstanding. It has been said frequently that a mathematical fact is an absolute fact and that its verity, necessity and certainty cannot be questioned anywhere in the universe whether on Jupiter, Neptune, Fomalhaut, Canopus or Spica. But having so declared, the fact of the sheer relativity of our knowledge is not disturbed thereby nor controverted. Happily, neither distance nor a lack of distance can in any way affect the quality of human knowledge, mathematical knowledge not excepted. That can only be affected by conditions which cause it to approach perfection and nothing but evolution can do that. In the light of results obtained in analytic investigations the question of the flexibility of mathematical applications becomes evident and one instead of being convinced of the vaunted invariability of the laws obtaining in the world of mathesis is, on the other hand, made aware of the remarkable and seemingly unrestrained facility with which these laws may be made to apply to any conditions or set of assumptions within the range of the mind's powers of conception. Mathematicians have deified the _definition_ and endowed it with omnific powers imputing unto it all the attributes of divinity--immutability, invariance, and sempiternity. In this they have erred grievously although, perhaps, necessarily. Mathetic conclusions are entirely conditional and depend for their certainty upon the imputed certitude of other propositions which in turn are dependent, in ever increasing and endlessly complex relations, upon previously assumed postulates. These facts make it exceedingly difficult to understand the attitude of mind which has obscured the utter mutability and consequent ultimate unreliability of the fine-spun theories of analytic machinations.