than such as springs from our own immoral attitude of will.”[183] In his _Foundation of the Metaphysic of Morals_, 1785, the noble apostrophe to the Good Will no doubt appears formally to proclaim as possible and desirable a complete human disposition, in which no considerations of Happiness play any part: “The good will is good, not through what it effects or produces, not through its utility for the attainment of any intention or end, but it is good through the quality of the volition alone; that is, it is good in itself.…” “If, with its greatest efforts, nothing were to be effected by it, and only the good will itself were to remain, this bare will would yet shine in lonely splendour as a jewel,--as something which has its full value in itself.” But further on he shows us how, after all, “this good will cannot, then, be the only and the whole good, but still it is the highest good and the condition for all the rest, even for our desire of happiness.”[184] Certain exaggerations, which are next developed by him here, shall be considered in a later chapter. 5. _Four important points._ Here I will but put together, in conclusion, four positions which I have rejoiced to find in two such utterly, indeed at times recklessly, independent writers as Professor Georg Simmel of Berlin and Professor A. E. Taylor. (1) Dr. Simmel declares, with admirable cogency: “The concept of religion completely loses in Kant, owing to his rationalistic manner of discovering in it a mere compound of the moral interest and the striving after happiness, its most specific and deepest character. No doubt these two apprehensions are also essential to religion, but precisely the direction in which Kant conjoins them,--that duty issues in happiness, is the least characteristic of religion, and is only determined by his Moralism, which refuses to recognize the striving after happiness as a valuable motive. The opposite direction appears to me as far more decisively a part of religion and of its incomparable force: for we thus find in religion precisely that ideal power, which makes it the duty of man to win his own salvation. According to the Kantian Moralism, it is every man’s private affair how he shall meet his requirement of happiness; and to turn such a private aspiration into an objective, ideal claim, would be for Kant a contradiction and abomination. In reality, however, religion itself _requires_ that man should have a care for his own welfare and beatitude, and in this consists its incomparable force of attraction.”[185] Let the reader note how entirely this agrees with, whilst properly safeguarding, the doctrine of Pure Love: it is the precise position of the best critics of the unamended Fénelon.