Certainly the position taken up towards this point in that very pregnant and curious, largely-overlooked little treatise, _The Canon of Pure Reason_, which (evidently an earlier and complete sketch), has been inserted by him into his later, larger, but materially altered scheme of the _Critique_ of 1781, (where it now forms the _Zweite Hauptstück_ of the _Transcendentale Methodenlehre_, ed. Kehrbach, Reclam, pp. 603-628), appears to be substantially acceptable.[182] “Happiness consists in the satisfaction of all our inclinations, according to their various character, intensity, and duration. The law of practical action, in so far as it is derived from the motive of happiness, I call Pragmatic, a Rule of Good Sense; the same law, in so far as it has for its motive only the becoming worthy of such happiness, I call Moral, the Moral Law. Now Morality already by itself constitutes a system, but Happiness does not do so, except in so far as Happiness is distributed in exact accordance with Morality. But such a distribution is only possible in the intelligible world,”--the world beyond phenomena which can be reached by our reason alone--“and under a wise Originator and Ruler. Such an One, together with life in such a world--a world which we are obliged to consider as a future one--reason finds itself forced to assume, or else to look upon the moral laws as empty phantoms, since the necessary result of these laws,--a result which that same reason connects with their very idea,--would have to fall away, if that assumption were to go. Hence every one looks upon the moral laws as _commandments_, a thing which they could not be, if they did not conjoin with their rule consequences of _a priori_ appropriateness, and hence if they did not carry with them _promises_ and _threats_. But this too they can do only if they lie within the compass of a Single Necessary Being, Itself the Supreme Good, Which alone can render possible such a unity embracing both means and end.--Happiness alone is, for our reason, far from being the Complete Good, for reason does not approve of Happiness unless it be united with the being worthy of Happiness, _i.e._ Moral Rectitude. But Morality alone, and with it the simple being worthy of happiness, is also far from the Complete Good. Even if reason, free from any consideration of any interest of its own, were to put itself in the position of a being that had to distribute all happiness to others alone, it could not judge otherwise: for, in the complete idea of practical action, both points are in essential conjunction, yet in suchwise that it is the moral disposition which, as condition, first renders possible a sharing in happiness, and not the prospect of happiness which first gives an opening to the moral disposition. For, in this latter case, the disposition would not be moral, and, consequently, would not deserve that complete happiness to which reason can assign no other limitation