Other customs, such as the Indian council of war, the Indian calumet of peace, the stoic fortitude of the Indian warrior, the patient bearing of the Indian squaw, their scalpings during war, their probationary tortures during peace, preeminently interesting objects of description, have a subordinate value in ethnology. Value, however, they have. The list of them is a long one, and out of it may be selected numerous characteristics of a twofold import. 1. American, or general characteristics, viz.: those which (without being universal) are general in the new world, whilst (without being absolutely non-existent) they are rare in the old. 2. Sectional characteristics, or those which distinguish one American tribe from another. Of the first series, there are two divisions, the positive and the negative. In respect to the positively characteristic practices of America, the use of the scalping-knife is, perhaps, the most typical. Horrible modes of mutilation are common in Asia and Africa (in Africa most especially); but the exact method in question I have not found except in America. Next to this, the habit of artificially flattening the head deserves notice. It is not, however, wholly unknown in the old world; since in Arakan we find traces of it. The negative characteristics are, perhaps, more important than the positive ones--preeminent amongst these being the utter absence (with the exception of a partial approach to it in the care bestowed by the Peruvians upon the llama and vicugna) of the true pastoral state throughout the whole length and breadth of America. Agriculture there is, and hunting there is,--the former developing an approach to an industrial development, and the latter determining a semi-nomadic form of life--but the absence of a true pastoral state wherein horses are used for riding, oxen for draught, and cows, ewes, or mares, for milking, is a remarkable negative characteristic which distinguishes the aboriginal American from the Arctic Sea to Cape Horn. That the appreciation of _differentiæ_ of this kind is wholly incapable of being arrived at _à priori_, but that it must be the result of a special induction by which we historically determine how one (or more) of certain undoubtedly allied divisions of the human species may want characteristics which occur in the others (and _vice versâ_) is a truth which requires a fuller recognition than it has found; since it is far easier for a writer to show in what customs two great sections of a population differ from one another, than to ascertain what that discrepancy imports. Whilst one, therefore, makes it a difference _in kind_, another considers it as one _in degree only_. The present writer, who _has_ bestowed some pains on the special question of _valuation_ or _appreciation_, generally speaking puts them low.