The nature of the physical worldEddington, Arthur Stanley, Sir
Philosophy
The nature of the physical world
Eddington, Arthur Stanley, Sir
Physics -- Philosophy; Science -- Philosophy
Our conception of substance is only vivid so long as we do not
face it. It begins to fade when we analyse it. We may dismiss many
of its supposed attributes which are evidently projections of our
sense-impressions outwards into the external world. Thus the colour
which is so vivid to us is in our minds and cannot be embodied in a
legitimate conception of the substantial object itself. But in any case
colour is no part of the essential nature of substance. Its supposed
nature is that which we try to call to mind by the word “concrete”,
which is perhaps an outward projection of our sense of touch. When
[Pg 274]
I try to abstract from the bough everything but its substance or
concreteness and concentrate on an effort to apprehend this, all ideas
elude me; but the effort brings with it an instinctive tightening of
the fingers—from which perhaps I might infer that my conception of
substance is not very different from my arboreal ancestor’s.
So strongly has substance held the place of leading actor on the stage
of experience that in common usage concrete and real are
almost synonymous. Ask any man who is not a philosopher or a mystic to
name something typically real; he is almost sure to choose a concrete
thing. Put the question to him whether Time is real; he will probably
decide with some hesitation that it must be classed as real, but he has
an inner feeling that the question is in some way inappropriate and
that he is being cross-examined unfairly.
In the scientific world the conception of substance is wholly lacking,
and that which most nearly replaces it, viz. electric charge, is not
exalted as star-performer above the other entities of physics. For
this reason the scientific world often shocks us by its appearance of
unreality. It offers nothing to satisfy our demand for the concrete.
How should it, when we cannot formulate that demand? I tried to
formulate it; but nothing resulted save a tightening of the fingers.
Science does not overlook the provision for tactual and muscular
sensation. In leading us away from the concrete, science is reminding
us that our contact with the real is more varied than was apparent
to the ape-mind, to whom the bough which supported him typified the
beginning and end of reality.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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