The nature of the physical worldEddington, Arthur Stanley, Sir
Philosophy
The nature of the physical world
Eddington, Arthur Stanley, Sir
Physics -- Philosophy; Science -- Philosophy
The trouble that arises is not that we have found anything necessarily
wrong with the frame of location that has been employed in our system
of physics; it has not led to experimental contradictions. The only
thing known to be “wrong” with it is that it is not unique. If we
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had found that our frame was unsatisfactory and another frame was
preferable, that would not have caused a great revolution of thought;
but to discover that ours is one of many frames, all of which are
equally satisfactory, leads to a change of interpretation of the
significance of a frame of location.
“Commonsense” Objections. Before going further I must answer
the critic who objects in the name of commonsense. Space—his
space—is so vivid to him. “This object is obviously here; that object
is just there. I know it; and I am not going to be shaken by any amount
of scientific obscurantism about contraction of measuring rods.”
We have certain preconceived ideas about location in space which have
come down to us from ape-like ancestors. They are deeply rooted in
our mode of thought, so that it is very difficult to criticise them
impartially and to realise the very insecure foundation on which they
rest. We commonly suppose that each of the objects surrounding us
has a definite location in space and that we are aware of the
right location. The objects in my study are actually in the positions
where I am “aware” that they are; and if an observer (on another star)
surveying the room with measuring rods, etc., makes out a different
arrangement of location, he is merely spinning a scientific paradox
which does not shake the real facts of location obvious to any man of
commonsense. This attitude rejects with contempt the question, How am
I aware of the location? If the location is determined by scientific
measurements with elaborate precautions, we are ready enough to suggest
all sorts of ways in which the apparatus might have misbehaved; but
if the knowledge of location is obtained with no precautions, if it
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just comes into our heads unsought, then it is obviously true and to
doubt it would be flying in the face of commonsense! We have a sort of
impression (although we do not like to acknowledge it) that the mind
puts out a feeler into space to ascertain directly where each familiar
object is. That is nonsense; our commonsense knowledge of location
is not obtained that way. Strictly it is sense knowledge, not
commonsense knowledge. It is partly obtained by touch and
locomotion; such and such an object is at arm’s length or a few steps
away. Is there any essential difference (other than its crudity)
between this method and scientific measurements with a scale? It is
partly obtained by vision—a crude version of scientific measurement
with a theodolite. Our common knowledge of where things are is not a
miraculous revelation of unquestionable authority; it is inference
from observations of the same kind as, but cruder than, those made in
a scientific survey.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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