The nature of the physical worldEddington, Arthur Stanley, Sir
Philosophy
The nature of the physical world
Eddington, Arthur Stanley, Sir
Physics -- Philosophy; Science -- Philosophy
There is nothing substantial about my second table. It is nearly
all empty space—space pervaded, it is true, by fields of force, but
[Pg xi]
these are assigned to the category of “influences”, not of “things”.
Even in the minute part which is not empty we must not transfer the
old notion of substance. In dissecting matter into electric charges we
have travelled far from that picture of it which first gave rise to
the conception of substance, and the meaning of that conception—if
it ever had any—has been lost by the way. The whole trend of modern
scientific views is to break down the separate categories of “things”,
“influences”, “forms”, etc., and to substitute a common background of
all experience. Whether we are studying a material object, a magnetic
field, a geometrical figure, or a duration of time, our scientific
information is summed up in measures; neither the apparatus of
measurement nor the mode of using it suggests that there is anything
essentially different in these problems. The measures themselves afford
no ground for a classification by categories. We feel it necessary to
concede some background to the measures—an external world; but the
attributes of this world, except in so far as they are reflected in the
measures, are outside scientific scrutiny. Science has at last revolted
against attaching the exact knowledge contained in these measurements
to a traditional picture-gallery of conceptions which convey no
authentic information of the background and obtrude irrelevancies into
the scheme of knowledge.
I will not here stress further the non-substantiality of electrons,
since it is scarcely necessary to the present line of thought. Conceive
them as substantially as you will, there is a vast difference between
my scientific table with its substance (if any) thinly scattered in
specks in a region mostly empty and the table of everyday conception
which we regard as the type of solid reality—an incarnate protest
[Pg xii]
against Berkleian subjectivism. It makes all the difference in the
world whether the paper before me is poised as it were on a swarm of
flies and sustained in shuttlecock fashion by a series of tiny blows
from the swarm underneath, or whether it is supported because there
is substance below it, it being the intrinsic nature of substance to
occupy space to the exclusion of other substance; all the difference in
conception at least, but no difference to my practical task of writing
on the paper.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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