The nature of the physical worldEddington, Arthur Stanley, Sir
Philosophy
The nature of the physical world
Eddington, Arthur Stanley, Sir
Physics -- Philosophy; Science -- Philosophy
Suppose that we had had to identify “becoming” with electrical
potential-gradient instead of with entropy-change. We discover
potential through the readings of a voltmeter. The numerical reading
stands for something in the condition of the world, but we form no
picture of what that something is. In scientific researches we only
make use of the numerical value—a code-number attached to a background
outside all conception. It would be very interesting if we could
relate this mysterious potential to any of our familiar conceptions.
Clearly, if we could identify the change of potential with the
familiar moving on of time, we should have made a great step towards
grasping its intrinsic nature. But turning from supposition to fact,
we have to identify potential-gradient with force. Now it is true
that we have a familiar conception of force—a sensation of muscular
effort. But this does not give us any idea of the intrinsic nature of
potential-gradient; the sensation is mere mind-spinning provoked by
nervous impulses which have travelled a long way from the seat of the
force. That is the way with all physical entities which affect the mind
through the sense organs. The interposed nerve-mechanism would prevent
any close association of the mental image with the physical cause,
[Pg 97]
even if we were disposed to trust our mental insight when it has a
chance of operating directly.
Or suppose that we had had to identify force with entropy-gradient.
That would only mean that entropy-gradient is a condition which
stimulates a nerve, which thereupon transmits an impulse to the brain,
out of which the mind weaves its own peculiar impression of force. No
one would feel intuitive objection to the hypothesis that the muscular
sensation of force is associated with change of organisation of the
molecules of the muscle.
Our trouble is that we have to associate two things, both of which we
more or less understand, and, so far as we understand them, they are
utterly different. It is absurd to pretend that we are in ignorance of
the nature of organisation in the external world in the same way that
we are ignorant of the intrinsic nature of potential. It is absurd to
pretend that we have no justifiable conception of “becoming” in the
external world. That dynamic quality—that significance which makes
a development from past to future reasonable and a development from
future to past farcical—has to do much more than pull the trigger of a
nerve. It is so welded into our consciousness that a moving on of time
is a condition of consciousness. We have direct insight into “becoming”
which sweeps aside all symbolic knowledge as on an inferior plane. If
I grasp the notion of existence because I myself exist, I grasp the
notion of becoming because I myself become. It is the innermost Ego of
all which is and becomes.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account