The Navy of the American Revolution : $b Its administration, its policy, and its achievementsPaullin, Charles Oscar
History
The Navy of the American Revolution : $b Its administration, its policy, and its achievements
Paullin, Charles Oscar
United States -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783 -- Naval operations; United States. Navy -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783
But a more extensive naval plan than this was in Morris’s mind,
and one which could be undertaken independent of foreign ships. On
July 30, 1782, he submitted to Congress an estimate for the public
services of the United States for the year 1783, amounting in all
to eleven millions of dollars. More than one-fifth of this sum was
to be spent on the navy. “Congress will observe,” he said, “that
the estimates for the Marine Department amount to two Millions and
a half, whereas there was no Estimate made for that Service in the
last year any more than for the civil list.” Morris based this most
remarkable recommendation for a naval increase on the belief that
the enemy had changed his mode of warfare, and that it was now his
purpose to annihilate the commerce of America, and thus starve her
into submission. With this sort of a campaign, conducted by the
enemy, an American army without a navy would be burdensome without
being able to accomplish anything. With a navy, we could prevent
the enemy from making predatory excursions, ruining our commerce,
and capturing our supplies; he would either be compelled to keep a
superior naval force in this country, which would give our allies a
naval superiority elsewhere; or else he must permit the balance of
naval strength in America to be on our side; in which latter case we
could protect our trade, annoy his commerce and cut off the supplies
which he would be sending to his posts in America. Then, concluded
Morris in words which remind one of the annual report of some recent
Secretary of the Navy asking for the yearly quota of battleships: “By
oeconomizing our Funds and constructing six ships annually we should
advance so rapidly to Maritime importance that our enemy would be
convinced not only of the Impossibility of subduing us, but also of
the Certainty that his forces in this Country must eventually be lost
without being able to produce him any possible Advantage;” and we
should in this way regain the “full Possession of our Country without
the Expence of Blood, or treasure, which must attend any other Mode
of Operations, and while we are pursuing those Steps which lead to
the Possession of our natural Strength and Defence.”[299]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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