On October 16, and again on November 16, the Rhode Island instructions were postponed.[92] Samuel Ward had hopes for a favorable action on the latter day. On November 16 he wrote from Philadelphia to his brother in Rhode Island: “Our instruction for an American fleet has been long upon the table. When it was first presented, it was looked upon as perfectly chimerical; but gentlemen now consider it in a very different light. It is this day to be taken into consideration, and I have great hopes of carrying it. Dr. Franklin, Colonel Lee, the two Adamses, and many others, will support it. If it succeeds, I shall remember your ideas of our building two of the ships.”[93] The several postponements of the Rhode Island instructions make it clear that Congress was slow to reach the conclusion that the “building of a fleet” was desirable or feasible. It was one thing to fit out a few small vessels for intercepting British transports, and quite another to build a fleet of frigates. It is not surprising that under the circumstances Congress hesitated to embark on the larger undertaking. The difference in the presentation to Congress of the two propositions, both of which involved the procuring of a naval armament, is worthy of note, for it had its influence on legislation. The appointment of a committee to prepare a plan for intercepting transports, put the question in a softened, more veiled, and less direct form. It pointed the wedge of naval legislation by a tactful presentation, and drove it home with an exigency.