The Navy of the American Revolution : $b Its administration, its policy, and its achievementsPaullin, Charles Oscar
History
The Navy of the American Revolution : $b Its administration, its policy, and its achievements
Paullin, Charles Oscar
United States -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783 -- Naval operations; United States. Navy -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783
When America, in these first years of the twentieth century, makes an
invoice of her resources, she counts first her great prairies of the
Mississippi basin, her rich mines of the Alleghanies and Rockies, and
her wealth of manufactories and their products. In 1775 her assets
were of a different sort. America then was a mere strip of seacoast,
cut into a series of peninsulas by the lower courses of a number of
navigable rivers. Her interests and her wealth then were much more
largely maritime than now. Attention has already been directed to
the wide pursuit of commerce, shipbuilding, fishing, and whaling in
New England. It remains, to be said that in the Middle and Southern
colonies commerce and shipbuilding were important industries. During
the Revolution Virginia put more naval ships afloat than any other
colony. In the colonial period communication between the towns of
the colonies was best by water. The inhabitants of America, during
this period, were amphibious. They have lost this quality, for
their character is now fixed by the “West,” and not by the Atlantic
seaboard. In 1775 America had, relatively, many more seamen than in
1898.
In the light of these facts it seems somewhat singular that the
Revolutionary navy was forced to spend most of its days in port,
vainly trying to enlist seamen for its depleted crews. To be sure the
lack of sufficient armament, naval stores, and provisions was felt,
but it was the lack of sailors that constituted the chief obstacle
to the success of the Continental navy. Those vessels that finally
weighed anchor were wanting as a rule in this prime naval requisite.
The same causes that prevented seamen from enlisting lowered the
quality of those that did enlist, and kept them from entering for
longer than a single cruise. A ship’s complement of sailors was often
ill-assorted. Seamen were improvised from landsmen; captured British
seamen were coaxed into service; and for one cause or another many
nationalities at times shipped side by side. These conditions made
for insubordination, and even mutiny. On one occasion seventy or
eighty British sailors, who were enlisted on board the Continental
frigate “Alliance,” bound for France, planned to mutiny and carry the
frigate into an English port. In order to obtain seamen many measures
were resorted to by Congress, the states, the Marine Committee, Navy
Boards, and commanders of vessels. Premiums for importing seamen
were given to foreigners;[185] wages were advanced to recruits;[186]
attempts were made to place embargoes upon privateers;[187]
bounties were paid to seamen enlisting for a year;[188] inducements
were offered to those captured from the enemy to get them to enter
the American service;[189] some seamen were impressed; glowing
advertisements were inserted in the public prints;[190] and
broadsides, which cleverly recited the many advantages of the
Continental service, were displayed in sundry taverns.[191]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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